Electronic Agent: means a computer programme or an electronic or other automated means used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in part, in an automated transaction. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.
A Party may require that the offence be committed by infringing security measures, with the intent of obtaining computer data or other dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer system. A person who secures unauthorised access or attempts to secure access to a protected system in contravention of a provision of this Act commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than five thousand penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years or to both.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the interception without right, made by technical means, of non-public transmissions of computer data to, from or within a computer system, including electromagnetic emissions from a computer system carrying such computer data.
A Party may require that the offence be committed with dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer system. A person who intentionally accesses or intercepts an electronic record without authority or permission commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than two thousand five hundred penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not more than five years or to both.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration or suppression of computer data without right. A Party may reserve the right to require that the conduct described in paragraph 1 result in serious harm. A person who intentionally and without authority interferes with an electronic record in a way which causes the electronic record to be modified, destroyed or otherwise rendered ineffective, commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than two thousand five hundred penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not more than five years or to both.
A Person who does any direct or an indirect act without authority which the person knows or ought to have known will cause an unauthorised modification of any programme or electronic record held in a computer commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than five thousand penalty units or a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years or to both.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the serious hindering without right of the functioning of a computer system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data.
A person who commits any act described in this Act with intent to interfere with access to an information system to effect a denial, including a partial denial of service to legitimate users commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than two thousand five hundred penalty units or a term of imprisonment of not more than two years or to both.
A person who intentionally engages in conduct, including virus writing, virus and worm dissemination which causes a computer to cease to function permanently or temporarily commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than five thousand penalty units or to imprisonment for a term of not more than ten years or to both.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right: the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available of: device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in accordance with the above Articles 2 through 5; computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of a computer system is capable of being accessed, with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in Articles 2 through 5; and the possession of an item referred to in paragraphs a.
A Party may require by law that a number of such items be possessed before criminal liability attaches. This article shall not be interpreted as imposing criminal liability where the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available or possession referred to in paragraph 1 of this article is not for the purpose of committing an offence established in accordance with Articles 2 through 5 of this Convention, such as for the authorised testing or protection of a computer system.
Each Party may reserve the right not to apply paragraph 1 of this article, provided that the reservation does not concern the sale, distribution or otherwise making available of the items referred to in paragraph 1 a. A person who intentionally, recklessly, without lawful excuse or justification, possesses, produces, procures for use, imports, exports distribute or otherwise makes available.
With the intent that it be used by a person for an offence commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than five thousand penalty units or a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years or to both. A person who unlawfully produces, sells, offers to sell, procures for use, designs, adapt for use, distributes or possesses any device, including a computer programme or a component, which is designed primarily to overcome security measures for the protection of an electronic record, or performs any of those functions with regard to a password access code or any other similar kind of electronic record, commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than two thousand five hundred penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not more than five years or to both.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right, the input, alteration, deletion, or suppression of computer data, resulting in inauthentic data with the intent that it be considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were authentic, regardless whether or not the data is directly readable and intelligible.
A Party may require an intent to defraud, or similar dishonest intent, before criminal liability attaches. Sections , , , , , , , , and of the Criminal Offences Act, Act 29 on forgery apply with the necessary modification to any person who forges anything whether or not the forgery is in whole or in part effected by use of any electronic processor in electronic form. Section of the Criminal Offences Act, Act 29 on false pretences applies with the necessary modification to a representation whether or not the medium used in communicating the representation in part or in whole was an electronic processing system and whether or not the representation consists of an electronic record in part or in whole.
Whoever, with intent to deceive any person, forges any judicial or official document, shall be guilty of second degree felony. Whoever forges any document whatsoever, with intent to defraud or injure any person, or with intent to evade the requirements of the law, or with intent to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, any crime, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour. Whoever with intent to defraud, forges or counterfeits any hall-mark or make appointed, under authority of law, by any corporation or public officer to denote the weight, fineness, or age, or place of manufacture of any gold or silver plate or bullion, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.
Whoever forges or counterfeits any trade-mark, or marks with a forged or counterfeited trade-mark any goods or anything used in, or about, or in connection with the sale of any goods, or sells or offers for sale any goods or such thing so marked, or has in his possession, custody, or control any goods of such thing so marked, or any materials or means prepared or contrived for the forging or counterfeiting of any trade-mark, or for the marking of any goods or thing therewith, intending in any such case fraudulently to pass off, or to enable any other person fraudulently to pass off, any goods as having been lawfully marked with the trade-mark or as being of a character signified by the trade-mark, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.
Illustrations a A. Here A. It is not forgery for him to execute a document in that name, unless he does so with the intent to defraud, etc. Whoever without lawful excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has in his possession any instrument or thing specially contrived or adapted for purposes of forgery shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.
Whoever, with any of the intents mentioned in this Chapter, has in his possession any document or stamp, which is forged, counterfeited, or falsified, or which he knows not to be genuine, shall be liable to the like punishment as if he had, with that intent forged, counterfeited, or falsified the document or stamp.
A person counterfeits a stamp or mark if he makes any imitation thereof, or anything which is intended to pass or which may pass as such a stamp, or mark; he shall be guilty of counterfeiting, within the meaning of this Chapter, although he does not intend that any person should be defrauded or injured by, or that any further use should be made of, the specimen or pattern.
Whoever, with any of the intents mentioned in this Chapter, utters or in any manner deals with or uses, any such document, stamp as in this Chapter mentioned, knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, or falsified, or knowing it not to be genuine, shall be liable to the like punishment as if he had, with that intent, forged, counterfeited, or falsified the document, or stamp.
For the purposes of the provisions of this Code relating to the forgery, counterfeiting, falsifying, uttering, dealing with, using, or possessing of any document, stamp, or trade-mark, it is not necessary that the document, stamp, or trade-mark should be so complete, or should be intended to be made so complete, or should be capable of being made so complete, as to be valid or effectual for any of the purposes of a thing of the kind which it purports or is intended to be or to represent, or as to deceive a person of ordinary judgment and observation.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right, the causing of a loss of property to another person by:. Except as provided for in this Act, any offence under a law which is committed in whole or in part by use of an electronic medium or in electronic form is deemed to have been committed under that Act and the provisions of that Act shall apply with the necessary modification to the person who commits the offence.
A person who makes or causes to be made either directly or indirectly a false representation to procure the issue of an electronic payment medium personally or to another person commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than five thousand penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years or to both.
A person who without authority, in the course of an electronic fund transfer uses the personal or financial record or credit account numbers or electronic payment medium of another with intent to defraud an issuer or a creditor or who obtains money, goods, services or anything fraudulently commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than five thousand penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years or to both.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right, the following conduct: producing child pornography for the purpose of its distribution through a computer system; offering or making available child pornography through a computer system; distributing or transmitting child pornography through a computer system; procuring child pornography through a computer system for oneself or for another person; possessing child pornography in a computer system or on a computer-data storage medium.
A Party may, however, require a lower age-limit, which shall be not less than 16 years. Each Party may reserve the right not to apply, in whole or in part, paragraphs 1, sub-paragraphs d. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the infringement of copyright, as defined under the law of that Party, pursuant to the obligations it has undertaken under the Paris Act of 24 July revising the Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the WIPO Copyright Treaty, with the exception of any moral rights conferred by such conventions, where such acts are committed wilfully, on a commercial scale and by means of a computer system.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the infringement of related rights, as defined under the law of that Party, pursuant to the obligations it has undertaken under the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations Rome Convention , the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, with the exception of any moral rights conferred by such conventions, where such acts are committed wilfully, on a commercial scale and by means of a computer system.
A person who infringes a right protected under this Act commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction or to a fine of not more than one thousand penalty units and not less than five hundred penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not more than three years or to both; and in the case of a continuing offence to a further fine of not less than twenty-five penalty units and not more than one hundred penalty units for each day during which the offence continues.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, aiding or abetting the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with Articles 2 through 10 of the present Convention with intent that such offence be committed.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, an attempt to commit any of the offences established in accordance with Articles 3 through 5, 7, 8, and 9. Each Party may reserve the right not to apply, in whole or in part, paragraph 2 of this article.
Sections 20 and 21 of the Criminal Offences Act, Act 29 on abetment of crime applies with the necessary modification to any person who abets a crime applies with the necessary modification to any person who abets a crime whether the medium used in whole or in part was an electronic medium or an electronic agent. Section 18 of the Criminal Offences Act, Act 19 on attempts to commit crimes with the necessary modifications to any person who attempts to commit a crime whether the medium used in whole or in part was an electronic medium or an electronic agent.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for a criminal offence established in accordance with this Convention, committed for their benefit by any natural person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading position within it, based on: a power of representation of the legal person; an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; an authority to exercise control within the legal person.
In addition to the cases already provided for in paragraph 1 of this article, each Party shall take the measures necessary to ensure that a legal person can be held liable where the lack of supervision or control by a natural person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of a criminal offence established in accordance with this Convention for the benefit of that legal person by a natural person acting under its authority. Subject to the legal principles of the Party, the liability of a legal person may be criminal, civil or administrative.
Such liability shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural persons who have committed the offence. Any act of the members in general meeting, the board of directors, or a managing director while carrying on in the usual way the business of the company shall be treated as the act of the company itself; and accordingly, the company shall be criminally and civilly liable therefore to the same extent as if it were a natural person.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 through 11 are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, which include deprivation of liberty.
Each Party shall ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with Article 12 shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions or measures, including monetary sanctions. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish the powers and procedures provided for in this section for the purpose of specific criminal investigations or proceedings. Except as specifically provided otherwise in Article 21, each Party shall apply the powers and procedures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article to: the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 through 11 of this Convention; other criminal offences committed by means of a computer system; and the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence Each Party may reserve the right to apply the measures referred to in Article 20 only to offences or categories of offences specified in the reservation, provided that the range of such offences or categories of offences is not more restricted than the range of offences to which it applies the measures referred to in Article Each Party shall consider restricting such a reservation to enable the broadest application of the measure referred to in Article Where a Party, due to limitations in its legislation in force at the time of the adoption of the present Convention, is not able to apply the measures referred to in Articles 20 and 21 to communications being transmitted within a computer system of a service provider, which system: i.
Each Party shall consider restricting such a reservation to enable the broadest application of the measures referred to in Articles 20 and Each Party shall ensure that the establishment, implementation and application of the powers and procedures provided for in this Section are subject to conditions and safeguards provided for under its domestic law, which shall provide for the adequate protection of human rights and liberties, including rights arising pursuant to obligations it has undertaken under the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other applicable international human rights instruments, and which shall incorporate the principle of proportionality.
Such conditions and safeguards shall, as appropriate in view of the nature of the procedure or power concerned, inter alia, include judicial or other independent supervision, grounds justifying application, and limitation of the scope and the duration of such power or procedure.
To the extent that it is consistent with the public interest, in particular the sound administration of justice, each Party shall consider the impact of the powers and procedures in this section upon the rights, responsibilities and legitimate interests of third parties. A Party may provide for such an order to be subsequently renewed. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to oblige the custodian or other person who is to preserve the computer data to keep confidential the undertaking of such procedures for the period of time provided for by its domestic law.
ETA 99 2 A law enforcement officer executing a warrant under this Act is entitled to require a the person by whom or on whose behalf, the police officer has reasonable grounds to suspect, to produce a computer which is or has been used, or b any person in charge of, or otherwise concerned with the operation of the computer, to provide the officer or any authorised person with the reasonable technical and other assistance required for investigation or prosecution.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to search or similarly access: a computer system or part of it and computer data stored therein; and a computer-data storage medium in which computer data may be stored in its territory. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that where its authorities search or similarly access a specific computer system or part of it, pursuant to paragraph 1.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to seize or similarly secure computer data accessed according to paragraphs 1 or 2. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to order any person who has knowledge about the functioning of the computer system or measures applied to protect the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to: collect or record through the application of technical means on the territory of that Party, and compel a service provider, within its existing technical capability: to collect or record through the application of technical means on the territory of that Party; or to co-operate and assist the competent authorities in the collection or recording of, traffic data, in real-time, associated with specified communications in its territory transmitted by means of a computer system Where a Party, due to the established principles of its domestic legal system, cannot adopt the measures referred to in paragraph 1.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to oblige a service provider to keep confidential the fact of the execution of any power provided for in this article and any information relating to it. Where a Party, due to the established principles of its domestic legal system, cannot adopt the measures referred to in paragraph 1. Power to search for tainted property ETA 1 A Court may order the disclosure of the contents of an electronic communication that is in transit, held, maintained or has been in electronic storage in an electronic communications system by an electronic communication service provider.
Each Party may reserve the right not to apply or to apply only in specific cases or conditions the jurisdiction rules laid down in paragraphs 1. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Article 24, paragraph 1, of this Convention, in cases where an alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him or her to another Party, solely on the basis of his or her nationality, after a request for extradition This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised by a Party in accordance with its domestic law.
This article applies to extradition between Parties for the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 through 11 of this Convention, provided that they are punishable under the laws of both Parties concerned by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least one year, or by a more severe penalty. Where a different minimum penalty is to be applied under an arrangement agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation or an extradition treaty, including the European Convention on Extradition ETS No.
The criminal offences described in paragraph 1 of this article shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between or among the Parties. The Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty to be concluded between or among them. If a Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Party with which it does not have an extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition with respect to any criminal offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.
Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognise the criminal offences referred to in paragraph 1 of this article as extraditable offences between themselves. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the requested Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including the grounds on which the requested Party may refuse extradition.
If extradition for a criminal offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this article is refused solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought, or because the requested Party deems that it has jurisdiction over the offence, the requested Party shall submit the case at the request of the requesting Party to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution and shall report the final outcome to the requesting Party in due course.
Those authorities shall take their decision and conduct their investigations and proceedings in the same manner as for any other offence of a comparable nature under the law of that Party. Each Party shall, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe the name and address of each authority responsible for making or receiving requests for extradition or provisional arrest in the absence of a treaty.
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall set up and keep updated a register of authorities so designated by the Parties. Each Party shall ensure. The Parties shall afford one another mutual assistance to the widest extent possible for the purpose of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence.
Each Party shall also adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to carry out the obligations set forth in Articles 27 through Each Party may, in urgent circumstances, make requests for mutual assistance or communications related thereto by expedited means of communication, including fax or e-mail, to the extent that such means provide appropriate levels of security and authentication including the use of encryption, where necessary , with formal confirmation to follow, where required by the requested Party.
The requested Party shall accept and respond to the request by any such expedited means of communication. Except as otherwise specifically provided in articles in this chapter, mutual assistance shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the requested Party or by applicable mutual assistance treaties, including the grounds on which the requested Party may refuse co-operation.
The requested Party shall not exercise the right to refuse mutual assistance in relation to the offences referred to in Articles 2 through 11 solely on the ground that the request concerns an offence which it considers a fiscal offence. Where, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, the requested Party is permitted to make mutual assistance conditional upon the existence of dual criminality, that condition shall be deemed fulfilled, irrespective of whether its laws place the offence within the same category of offence or denominate the offence by the same terminology as the requesting Party, if the conduct underlying the offence for which assistance is sought is a criminal offence under its laws.
A Party may, within the limits of its domestic law and without prior request, forward to another Party information obtained within the framework of its own investigations when it considers that the disclosure of such information might assist the receiving Party in initiating or carrying out investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention or might lead to a request for co-operation by that Party under this chapter.
Prior to providing such information, the providing Party may request that it be kept confidential or only used subject to conditions. If the receiving Party cannot comply with such request, it shall notify the providing Party, which shall then determine whether the information should nevertheless be provided. If the receiving Party accepts the information subject to the conditions, it shall be bound by them.
Where there is no mutual assistance treaty or arrangement on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation in force between the requesting and requested Parties, the provisions of paragraphs 2 through 9 of this article shall apply. The provisions of this article shall not apply where such treaty, arrangement or legislation exists, unless the Parties concerned agree to apply any or all of the remainder of this article in lieu thereof.
Each Party shall designate a central authority or authorities responsible for sending and answering requests for mutual assistance, the execution of such requests or their transmission to the authorities competent for their execution. The central authorities shall communicate directly with each other; Each Party shall, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe the names and addresses of the authorities designated in pursuance of this paragraph; The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall set up and keep updated a register of central authorities designated by the Parties.
Each Party shall ensure that the details held on the register are correct at all times. Mutual assistance requests under this article shall be executed in accordance with the procedures specified by the requesting Party, except where incompatible with the law of the requested Party.
The requested Party may, in addition to the grounds for refusal established in Article 25, paragraph 4, refuse assistance if: the request concerns an offence which the requested Party considers a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence, or it considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests.
The requested Party may postpone action on a request if such action would prejudice criminal investigations or proceedings conducted by its authorities. Before refusing or postponing assistance, the requested Party shall, where appropriate after having consulted with the requesting Party, consider whether the request may be granted partially or subject to such conditions as it deems necessary.
The requested Party shall promptly inform the requesting Party of the outcome of the execution of a request for assistance. Reasons shall be given for any refusal or postponement of the request. The requested Party shall also inform the requesting Party of any reasons that render impossible the execution of the request or are likely to delay it significantly. The requesting Party may request that the requested Party keep confidential the fact of any request made under this chapter as well as its subject, except to the extent necessary for its execution.
If the requested Party cannot comply with the request for confidentiality, it shall promptly inform the requesting Party, which shall then determine whether the request should nevertheless be executed. In the event of urgency, requests for mutual assistance or communications related thereto may be sent directly by judicial authorities of the requesting Party to such authorities of the requested Party. In any such cases, a copy shall be sent at the same time to the central authority of the requested Party through the central authority of the requesting Party.
Any request or communication under this paragraph may be made through the International Criminal Police Organisation Interpol. Where a request is made pursuant to sub-paragraph a. This is what their Lordships said:. However, in view of the age of the Appellant at the time of offence sic was convicted sic which was 20 years, the appeal against sentence will be sustained. Accordingly the Appellant Isaac Amaniampong who stands convicted for conspiracy to commit crime to wit robbery and robbery all contrary to the criminal and other sic offences Act as amended shall be sentenced to a prison term of 30 years.
The 70 years prison sentence imposed by the trial court is here by set aside and same replaced with the term of 30 years in view of the age of the appellant at the time the offence was committed as explained above. What did he go to Takoradi to do? From their statements to the police, the accused persons were all young adults between the ages of 18 and 22 years.
Is the commission of crime of the nature of robbery the best use they can put their youthful ages? Robbery is a felony and where harm is caused, as in this case the minimum sentence imposed by law is 15 years I. Punishment is justifiable as a deterrent not only to the criminal himself, but also, and even more importantly, to those who may have similar criminal propensity. A way must be found to protect society from the activities of these criminals and to me, this way is confinement for a considerable length of time.
The Appellant if he is mindful of reforming must do so whiles in prison. I therefore under the circumstances do not consider the 30 years I. L imposed on the Appellant by the Court of Appeal harsh and excessive. I have read the opinion of my worthy sister Owusu JSC and I agree with her conclusion that the appeal against conviction and sentence be dismissed. I have somehow been influenced and motivated by an incident that happened on 14 th May at the Korle bu Teaching Hospital Medical Block to write this opinion.
Whilst waiting to visit a patient, a lawyer who happened to know me disclosed my identity as a Judge, and the following discourse ensued between me and a gentleman who was also waiting to visit a patient or be attended to. What at all is wrong with you Judges in Ghana.
What criteria do you use in sentencing people? Someone steals a mobile phone and he is imprisoned 50 years, another steals millions of Ghana cedis and he is left off the hook. Ghanaians are watching. I could only sympathise with the gentleman and expressed the fact that I share in his frustrations and that I believe there are many Judges who also feel embarrassed by the media reports about some of these ridiculous sentences.
I also advised him that, because Judges all over the world have wide discretion whenever it comes to sentencing, it is difficult to control their exercise of discretion. I was however quick to assure him that steps had been taken by the Judiciary to come out with Guidelines that will assist Judges in sentencing persons convicted of crimes before the law courts. The appellant herein and two others were arraigned before the High Court, Sekondi on two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery.
The statement of offence and particulars of the offences with which they were charged reads as follows Conspiracy to commit a crime to wit Robbery contrary to sections 23 1 and of the Criminal Code, Act Godfred Aggrey alias Ekow, Salim Amin and Isaac Amaniampong alias Fifi on or about the 11 day of October, in Takoradi did agree and act together with a common purpose to commit crime to wit robbery.
Robbery contrary to section of the Criminal Code, Act 29 as amended by Act In this case, the appellant and the two others with whom he was arraigned before court, and another at large, attacked one Sharon Owusu Antwi, a student then at the Takoradi Polytechnic at about 3. However, through the vigilance of other passengers at the City Express Terminal in Takoradi and the boldness and courage of the officials of the Transport Terminal, the three persons who were arraigned before court were arrested at the Takoradi Police station as the driver was instructed to drive there due to the suspicious conduct of the appellant and his gang of robbers.
However, one of the members of the gang escaped but the appellant and his two other friends were not so lucky. The cutlass for example was found hidden in the dress of the appellant herein. From the facts of the case, it is apparent that the appellant and his group were a gang of criminals who had invaded the twin city of Sekondi-Takoradi with the sole aim of robbing their victims.
This can be explained by their accoutrements, the pistol, cutlass, and razor blades. After trial, during which the prosecution called four witnesses, which included the victim, the transport officials at the City Express and the Police Investigator, the appellant and the other persons also opened their defence. After evaluating the evidence against the appellant and his criminal gang the learned trial Judge summed up the evidence and the law before he passed sentence on all the accused persons including the appellant in the following terms.
I accept the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses. The witnesses appeared serious and honest to me and the evidence put forward dovetail so well that it formed a formidable case of conspiracy as charged and robbery. I regret the explanations given by the accused persons. Their evidence did not only contradict their statements on record, they also cast themselves out as persons with a double tongue.
They are persons devoted to crime and would lie about anything without blinking an eye. I find them to be tough rebels without anything to loose. I find all three accused persons guilty of both charges of conspiracy to rob and robbery and convict each of them on the two 2 counts accordingly.
The accused persons appear unrepentant and have shown no remorse. You are the team leader. You recruited the two other accused persons. You supplied them with the weapons. You caused the operation to be undertaken. You have another case pending in the Circuit Court. From the above, the appellant just like his colleague the second accused were all sentenced to 70 years imprisonment.
The appellant herein appealed to the Court of Appeal sitting at Cape Coast against both conviction and sentence. The Court of Appeal in a unanimous decision dismissed the appeal against conviction but allowed the appeal against sentence in the following terms Accordingly, the Appellant Isaac Amaniampong who stands convicted for complicacy sic to commit crime to wit Robbery and Robbery all contrary to criminal and other offences Act as amended shall be sentenced to a prison term of 30 years.
The 70 years prison sentences imposed by the trial court is hereby set aside and same is replaced with the term of 30 years in view of the age of the appellant at the time the offence was committed as explained above. The term of 30years will be for both convicts and to run concurrently. The above constitute in the main the reasons why the Court of Appeal substantially reduced the prison term of 70 years to 30 years. It must be noted that the appellant was aged 20 years at the material time, and was a first offender.
Despite having benefited from the exercise of the discretion of the Court of Appeal in the huge hair cut in the sentence, the appellant nonetheless again appealed to this Court with the following as the grounds of appeal as well as reliefs sought from this court. The Appellate Court did not adequately consider the appeal against conviction. I have read the appeal record together with the submissions of learned Counsel for the appellant Nkrabeah Effah Dartey and that of the learned Chief State Attorney, K.
I have also critically considered the caution statement of the appellant and his co-accused and the law applicable. I am of the considered view that the appeal against conviction is only a wide goose chase and the appellant only embarked upon fishing in shallow waters with a flimsy hope that probably he might be successful.
Unfortunately, his fishing net and the expertise in spreading the nets have not been able to catch any fish. I will therefore accordingly dismiss the appeal against conviction and same is hereby dismissed. Since I intend to be somehow detailed and lengthy in my analysis on the appeal against sentence, primarily because of my encounter at the Korle bu Teaching Hospital on the 14 th May , an event I have already alluded to, I will set out in some detail the submissions of learned counsel on this issue of sentence.
Which weapon was used? What was stolen? What harm was caused to the victim? Please do not kill an ant with a sledge hammer. The Court of Appeal looked at the age of the Appellant — 20 years — and for that reason substituted 30 years for 70 years — it is still too high. Even assuming for argument only that the conviction should stand, looking at all the circumstances, where lies the basis for sentencing him to 30 years in prison? I find them to be tough rebels without anything to hide.
By contracts they are all first offenders, so where is the evidence that they are tough rebels? I pray most fervently that looking at his age and the circumstances of the case assuming you still want to uphold the conviction that you reduce the sentence to below 10 years IHL. This is because 30 years IHl imposed on the appellant for an offence like robbery which the society abhors is not excessive. Counsel did not consider the following fivefold purpose of a sentence in his plea for reduction of sentence: to be punitive calculated to deter others, to reform the offender, to appease the society and to be a safeguard to this country.
An offence which is of a very grave nature merits a severe punishment so. In a heinous crime like armed robbery the sentence must be punitive, deterrent or exemplary as stated in the case of Adu Boahen supra and Kwashie v the Republic  1 GLR where it was held that:.
The principles upon which the court would act on an appeal against sentence were that it would not interfere with a sentence on the mere ground that if members of the court had been trying the appellant, they might have passed a somewhat different sentence. From the conclusions reached by the trial High Court and the Court of Appeal as narrated supra, it is apparent they took the following factors into consideration before passing sentence in the case of the High Court, and in the context of the Court of Appeal, before reducing the sentence on appeal.
Due to the said factors, the trial court was of the view that the appellant and his gang needed to be kept away from society for a long time. It is no wonder that the 1 st accused in the trial was indeed sentenced to life imprisonment.
It is apparent that the main consideration of the Court of Appeal in allowing the appeal against the sentence of the appellant was his youthful age, 20 years at all times material to the circumstances of this case. Learned Counsel for the appellant, invited this court to take the following factors into consideration in respect of the reduction of sentence:. That because society abhors the offence of robbery — It is prudent to confine the appellant for a long time.
Submitted that the five fold nature of sentences when considered will not entitle the appellant to any reprieve. Learned Counsel then relied on the celebrated case of Kwashie v Republic already referred to supra. Learned Counsel also referred to the case of Apaloo v Republic also already referred to supra which established the fact that, an appellate court would only interfere with the sentence when it was of the opinion that the sentence was manifestly excessive having regard to the circumstances of the case or that the sentence was wrong in principle.
Unfortunately, as a country we have not improved our criminal justice regime since the Criminal and other Offences Procedure Act was passed in There have been several adhoc attempts through legislation to deal especially with menacing crimes like robbery, defilement and narcotics. In all these, it is certain we have been behaving like fire fighters, this is because the State only reacts to the sentencing regime on particular offences as and when the exigencies of the moment demands.
Being a first degree felony means that the legislature has categorized the offence of robbery as a grave one. The maximum sentence can therefore be any number of years that a court deems suitable and appropriate under the circumstances unless the statute states otherwise.
There is no doubt that robbery is a serious crime and various legislations in this country have sought to deal with it as best as they could. CRA No. Continuing further, the Court of Appeal observed in the Daniel Ntow v Republi c case referred to supra as follows What this meant was that the mandatory death and or life sentences had been done away with. Continuing, the Court of Appeal stated thus:.
The result has been the lengthy sentences that trial courts started to impose on convicted robbers. This has led to inconsistency in the sentences handed down by the courts. Whilst the minimum sentences have been fixed by operation of law, i. That is where the court in appropriate cases must consider the factors of punishment before sentences are imposed on convicted robbers. From the above quotation, it is clear that, the courts have been granted a lot of discretion in the sentencing regime of convicted persons charged with robbery.
This no doubt has accounted for the many varied, sometimes ridiculous sentences that the courts have been imposing of late in cases of robbery and stealing. For example, in case No. Logoh J, on the 9 th May convicted and imposed the following sentences on 1 st and 3 rd accused persons who faced two counts of conspiracy and robbery for the 1 st accused and robbery for the 3 rd accused to 15 years each with sentences to run concurrent.
It is also instructive to note that the learned trial Judge indicated that because both accused are young persons and first offenders they must be dealt with leniently. The judgment also indicated that the amounts stolen and which had been taken away by one of the accomplices, Osei Kwame who is on the run are:.
The offensive weapons used in the robbery attack were a knife , a pistol and rope with which they tied the hands and feet of the victim. Comparing the value of the items stolen in the Spintex road robbery case, with those in this appeal, it would appear that the value of the items in this appeal are nothing really of value. Secondly, whilst one of the accused persons in the Spintex road robbery case was an insider, i. However, considering that the accused persons got away with 15 years sentences in the Spintex robbery as compared to 30 years for the appellant in this appeal, it is clear then that the appellant herein, ought to be differently treated, by having a reduced prison sentence.
The gentleman who accosted me at the Korle bu Teaching Hospital in the incident I had referred to supra apparently has some measure of justification for the comments he made. It is because of the lack of consistency in our sentencing regime that comments like that can legitimately be made. The introduction to these guidelines which are yet to be operationalised states as follows:. It isimportant that everyone knows the principles a Judge or Magistrate useswhen fixing a sentence.
Everyone means the victim, the accused, the witnesses, their families and friends, the police, the lawyers, thecommunity, the press and the public at large. There are many factors to be taken into account and balanced against each other. Different Judges and Magistrates may fix different sentences for the same offence and offender. Consistency is important. No two cases are exactly the same. It would be wrong if widely different sentences were passed for two cases which are generally the same.
It is important that reasons are given for the sentence in every case. Everyone should know how a particular sentence is fixed. It is my hope that with the coming into force of these guidelines, seminars for all Judges and Magistrates especially in the trial courts, will be organized in order to keep them abreast with the contents and in a bid to operationalise the said guidelines. The guidelines must be understood as being guidelines only and an attempt to serve as a directional guide for Judges and Magistrates to know the limits within which they can sentence say in a robbery case, taking into consideration the force and or nature of the violence, the value of the items stolen and the premeditation with which the offence was committed among other factors.
This it is expected will narrow the wide discretion that judges have to some extent. But these are not be considered as having replaced the Judges discretion altogether. Various countries had been in the state in which Ghana now finds itself on the issue of inconsistent, disparaging and varied sentences on convicted persons. In the US for example, they sought to deal with this phenomenon by the setting up of a Sentencing Commission which came out with what is now generally known as the Sentencing Guidelines.
However, the U. Hall as follows:. S , argued 5 October, , decided 18 January by vote of 8 to 1; Blackmun for the Court, Scalia in dissent. Federal judges have traditionally exercised considerable discretion in fixing the terms of sentences for convicted offenders. Convinced of a need for more uniformity in sentencing practices, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of , creating the United States Sentencing Commission and giving it authority to establish ranges of sentences for all categories of federal offenses.
At least three were required to be federal judges, selected by the President from a list of six judges recommended by the Judicial Conference of the United States. This statutory challenge to judicial autonomy, plus the unusual provisions for appointment and removal of commission members, raised separation of powers issues. However, in Mistretta the Supreme Court upheld the sentencing law in all respects.
Blackmum ruled that locating the commission within the judicial branch did not violate the separation of powers doctrine p. The commission was not a court nor controlled by the judiciary. Requiring three federal judges to serve on the commission along with non-judges did not affect the integrity or independence of the judicial branch. Giving the president power to remove commission members had no effect on the tenure or compensation of Article III judges.
Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting, challenged the constitutionality of the commission. He concluded that it was a violation of Article III of the Constitution to have federal judges serve in policy-making positions in the executive branch. It is therefore my hope that lessons would be learnt from this U. I am also very optimistic that support would be lent to this initiative from the Judiciary. What then should be the clear indicators and or criteria that the Courts must use in exacting punishment on convicted persons, especially custodial sentences?
Why do we have punishment at all? Why not something else altogether? Why do we punish people who commit offences? The imposition of punishment therefore has various aims. The main aims for the imposition of punishment are generally acknowledged to be: 1 retribution; 2 deterrence; 3 prevention ; 4 reformation ; 5 rehabilitation ; and 6 justice. There are two main theories of retribution. The first is grounded in revenge. The adherents of this theory believe that an offender must be made to suffer to the same extent that the victim suffered.
This is a largely discredited view of the purpose of punishment for one might end up imposing punishment for the sake of punishment. The second and more respectable view of retributive punishment is that the punishment must fit the crime. This view takes the position that an individual offender must get his just deserts. In many ways most systems of criminal justice adhere to this view for there are different degrees of punishment for different degrees of criminal activity.
The very fact that different degrees of punishments are prescribed for offences with various degrees of gravity itself is an indication of a built-in system of retribution. The effort to make the offence fit the crime also has the result of making the punishment reflect the communities values, e. Section 69 provides that intentionally and unlawfully causing harm by the use of an offensive weapon is a first degree felony.
Clearly, from this manner of categorization, it can be appreciated that this community considers the resort to weapons in times of conflict between individuals as more grievous than the use of body parts such as hands. Thus although the same degree of injury may be caused by the use of hands as by offensive weapons, the use of the latter offence is considered to be a more serous offence than the former.
All punishment is essentially retributive since it is invoked in response to the commission of a crime, and not merely because its imposition could prevent crime. Mensa-Bonsu again on pages sums the utilitarian theory of punishment as propounded by Jeremy Bentham which deals with deterrence as follows The utilitarian theory as espoused by Jeremy Bentham is essentially to the effect that laws must ensure the greatest good for the greatest number of people.
Thus whatever the law-making effort engaged in, it must produce useful results that would ensure that happiness of the greatest number. For this reason, punishment must not be considered as an end in itself, but as a means to an end. It must serve a purpose, or it is an exercise in waste.
When punishment succeeds in reducing crime because people realise that offenders would be punished, that is a useful end. Therefore the concept of deterrence is very prominent in the arsenal of utilitarians. Adherents of this theory believe that punishment should serve a deterrent purpose so as to indicate to the community that conduct of the nature punished would not be tolerated in the society.
Deterrence operates on two different levels: General deterrence and Specific deterrence. This refers to the effect of the imposition of a particular punishment on the generality of people within a given society. Thus, when a convicted person is punished severely as an example to all and sundry, the hope is that the fear of the sanction would ensure that other like-minded people would be discouraged from pursuing any such activity.
The general public would be thus discouraged from undertaking any like acts. Deterrent sentences tend to be severe and may often be unfair to the particular individual, but utilitarians would argue that it is better for one individual to be sacrificed to preserve the happiness of the greater majority than that the individual should be protected, at the cost of failing to teach the rest of the community the necessary lessons. The various principles espoused by the learned and distinguished author have been applied by the Courts in a number of cases.
See for example the cases of:. But the facts of the case has been lost and the real facts behind the principle stated in Azu Crabbe J. I will therefore set out portions of the judgment I consider worthwhile to support my analysis and conclusion in this opinion as follows. See page of the report,. The second appellant was also, at the material time, an escort police officer at the same station.
The evidence against the two appellants was that at 9 p. On leaving the police station the appellants called the third accused, also an escort police constable, to join them, and at about The fourth accused boarded the bus with two other men, and they set out on their journey at about 7 p.
Just before reaching Afienya the bus was overtaken by a taxi, which stopped a few yards ahead. The first appellant alighted from the taxi and signalled the bus to stop. When the bus stopped the third accused came out of the taxi and boarded the bus on the instructions of the first appellant.
After that both the taxi and the bus continued their journey. At the Afienya barrier, the bus was stopped and searched, but nothing incriminating was found in it, and the driver was allowed to proceed. When the taxi got to the barrier the first appellant told the policemen there that they were on their way for some investigations, and so the taxi was allowed to pass without any hindrance. The taxi again overtook the bus, and at about two miles to Kpong, the first appellant asked the driver to stop by the road-side.
Soon the bus also arrived at the spot, and the fourth accused asked the driver of the bus to park behind the taxi. The two appellants [p. It was about midnight, and Ankuma had gone to bed. He was aroused from his sleep and was told that he had in his possession some contraband goods.
The first appellant produced from his pocket and showed to him a piece of paper which he alleged was a search-warrant. The rooms of the house were thoroughly searched, and the appellants and their confederates carried away with them the goods enumerated in count two of the indictment, and deposited them in the bus. The appellants arrested Ankuma and put him into their taxi and asked him to take them to the person who had brought the goods to his house.
The taxi driver drove towards the direction of Tema, and on the way the appellants told Ankuma that they were taking him to the Dodowa Police Station. But after the taxi had travelled a distance of about one mile it stopped, and the appellants asked Ankuma to go down and look for the owner of the goods. Meanwhile, the bus was heading towards Tema, and as it approached the Afienya barrier it was overtaken by the taxi, and the driver was signalled to stop.
It stopped, and the taxi also stopped in front of it. The second appellant got out of the taxi and had a quiet conversation with the third accused, who was sitting in the bus. After this the taxi moved, and the third accused asked the driver of the bus to follow the taxi. At the Afienya barrier the taxi was stopped by the police, and whilst the police pretended to be inspecting it, the bus passed without stopping. The third accused instructed the driver of the bus not to stop for inspection.
On the way the taxi again overtook the bus and drove straight to Tema and parked at Community No. Later the bus also arrived at Community No. At about 3. The first appellant was in mufti, and the second appellant was dressed in police uniform.
The driver of the bus carried out the instruction which he received from the fourth accused, and subsequently, during the investigation by the police into this case, one case only of tobacco was discovered in the house of the fourth accused during a search. The rest of the goods have not been recovered. The arguments put forward by Mr.
Agadzi in support of the appeal against sentence may be summarised as follows: 1 that the trial judge gave no reasons for the severe sentence that he passed on the first appellant; 2 that having regard to the value of the goods stolen the sentence is excessive; 3 that the first appellant had no record of any previous convictions and since he is a first offender he ought to have been more leniently dealt with; and 4 that the mere fact that the first appellant was a police officer was not by itself a good enough reason for imposing an unusually harsh sentence.
Dealing with the first submission, we would state that there is no obligation on a trial judge to give reasons, when imposing sentence on a convicted person. We will take the second and third submissions together…. In determining the length of sentence, the factors which the trial judge is entitled to consider are: 1 the intrinsic seriousness of the offence; 2 the degree of revulsion felt by law-abiding citizens of the society for the particular crime; 3 the premeditation with which the criminal plan was executed; 4 the prevalence of the crime within the particular locality where the offence took place, or in the country generally; 5 the sudden increase in the incidence of the particular crime; and 6 mitigating or aggravating circumstances such as extreme youth, good character and the violent manner in which the offence was committed.
Blake  2 Q. It was intended to be punitive, it was designed and calculated to deter others, and it was meant to be a safeguard to this country. The Court then continued as follows In recent months there has been a sudden increase in the incidence of trafficking in contraband goods, and this has caused a great deal of public anxiety.
The first appellant must have known that this offence was particularly grave, from the public point of view, because of the severe damage it does to this country's economy, which is already fragile. In collaboration with two other police officers, the first appellant used his office as a police detective to seize a large quantity of goods which had been smuggled into this country. The bus carrying the goods passed through the Afienya barrier without inspection in a manner which leaves this court in no doubt that it was all prearranged.
Apart from one case of tobacco, none of the other goods have been recovered. I may at this juncture venture to state that this was definitely an earlier attempt by the first appellant therein in collaboration with the others mentioned therein, to create, loot and share their booty. The Court of Appeal continued by indicating their revulsion against this criminal conduct.
Upon these facts, which reveal an offence of a very grave nature, the sentence must not only be punitive, but it must also be a deterrent or exemplary. The sentence must mark the disapproval of our society of such conduct by police officers.
Thus, in R. In a footnote to the Goldsmith case D. Thomas said in  Crim. We wish to refer briefly to a few other cases to show the attitude of an appellate court where a deterrent sentence is passed at the trial. Rhodes  Crim. The prisoner, a man of 46 years of age, had pleaded guilty to a charge of forgery. The offence was committed when the prisoner, who was the occupier of a council house, forged a certificate of wages in order to qualify for a rebate of rent based upon his earnings.
The prisoner was previously of good character. The appeal court declined to interfere with the sentence, because it was clear that the recorder had been minded deliberately to make an example of the prisoner and of two other men in similar cases. Machin  Crim. It was reported that:. However, single women must be protected against disgraceful assaults of this kind, which were all too prevalent in this country today.
Smith No. He had no previous convictions, and had had 41 years service on railways. He also had a good army record. In the view of the appeal court since the appellant was in a position of trust and the theft of goods in transit was prevalent, it therefore found nothing wrong in principle with the sentence of fifteen months' imprisonment. Gosling  Crim. He had no previous convictions, and was therefore a first offender.
The appeal court, nevertheless, held that a deterrent sentence of twelve months' imprisonment was proper despite his previous good character. We think that the argument in this case that the sentence of seven years' imprisonment with hard labour should be reduced on account of the first appellant's previous clean record must fail. The final argument which Mr. Agadzi addressed to us was that the position of the first appellant ought not to have influenced the trial judge to pass a severe sentence.
This is an ordinary case he said, and an ordinary sentence below seven years' imprisonment would have been adequate. We cannot accede to this argument. In determining a sentence it is proper for the court to consider, on the one hand, the social or official position of the offender, and on the other, that the offence may be aggravated by reason of such position.
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In accordance with clause 3 of article 88 of the Constitution, a prosecution shall not be instituted under section without the consent of the Attorney-General against. A person who commits either of the following acts, with intent to aggrieve or annoy any other person, is liable to a fine not exceeding fifteen penalty units, that is to say,. Piracy, Official Secrets Act, The Criminal Code. The Peace Preservation Ordinance. Section 11 of the Unlicensed Guides Prohibition Ordinance.
Sections 6 and 7 of the Undesirable Advertisements Ordinance. Reaffirmation of the Abolition of Slavery Ordinance. Slave Dealing Ordinance. The Criminal Code Amendment Ordinance, The Criminal Code Amendment Act, The Sedition Act, The Treason Act, Section 47 of the National Assembly Act, Act Your email address will not be published.
Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. Wilful neglect of duty to fill up or transmit certificate of marriage. Mode of proving marriage or divorce. Allowing persons under age to be in brothels. Persons trading in prostitution. Soliciting or importuning for immoral purposes. A person commits a misdemeanour who in a public place or in sight of a public place persistently solicits or importunes a to obtain clients for a prostitute, or b for any other immoral purposes.
Soliciting or importuning by prostitutes. A person commits a misdemeanour who a keeps or manages or assists in the management of a brothel; or b being a tenant, lessee or occupier or person in charge of premises, knowingly permits the premises or a part of the premises to be used as a brothel or for the purposes of habitual prostitution; or c being the lessor or landlord of any premises or the agent of the lessor or landlord, lets the premises or a part of the premises, with the knowledge that the premises or that part is to be used as a brother, or is wilfully a party to the continued use of the premises or a part of the premises as a brothel.
A person who publicly and wilfully does a grossly indecent act commits a misdemeanour. Immoral or indecent customs or practices, bereaved spouses. Publication or sale of obscene material. A publishes a book for the use of physicians or surgeons, or for persons seeking medical or surgical information.
Whatever may be the subject with which the book deals, if they are treated with as much decency as the subject admits, A has not committed a criminal offence. B publishes extracts from the book mentioned in the last illustration, arranged or printed in a manner that gives unnecessary prominence to indecent matters. If the Court or jury is of the opinion that the publication is calculated unnecessarily and improperly to excite passion, or to corrupt morals, B ought to be convicted.
Further offences relating to obscenity. Getting others to do the acts punishable under section A person who gives or delivers to any other person a picture or printed or written matter mentioned in section with the intent that it be affixed, inscribed, delivered or exhibited as mentioned in that section commits a criminal offence and is liable to a fine not exceeding twenty-five penalty units.
Advertisements as to venereal disease declared indecent. Hindering burial of dead body. Carrying on of noxious trade, interference with public rights. Explanation as to carrying on of noxious trade. The Constitution classifies subsidiary legislation as part of the laws of Ghana. Article 11 7 of the Constitution provides further that any Order, Rule or Regulation made by a person or authority under a power conferred by the Constitution or any other law, shall be laid before Parliament, published in the Gazette and comes into force after twenty-one sitting days of Parliament, unless two-thirds or more members of Parliament vote to annul it.
The colonial subsidiary legislation was usually published as part of, or as special supplement to, the annual or consolidated compilations of laws after they had appeared in the official gazettes. Subsidiary legislation in Ghana include legislative instruments, executive instruments, constitutional instruments and regulatory notices of government ministries, government departments and agencies. Section 4 of the Statutory Instrument Act, , as amended, defines a legislative instrument as a statutory instrument declared by the Attorney-General to be legislative in character.
Section 5 of the Statutory Instruments Act, , as amended, states that statutory instruments other than legislative instruments or instruments of a judicial character shall be known as executive instruments. Article of the Constitution defines constitutional instruments as instruments made under a power conferred by the Constitution.
The official sources for subsidiary legislation in Ghana are:. Datacenta again offers the best access to subsidiary legislation in Ghana. It offers them as follows:. Ghana, being a common law jurisdiction, case law and judicial precedent play an important role in the law and its development. Article 3 of the Constitution states that the judicial power of Ghana shall be vested in the Judiciary.
Article of the Constitution mandates the independence of the judiciary. Article of the Constitution pronounces that the Supreme Court shall be the final court of appeal. The Supreme Court, while treating its previous decisions as normally binding, may depart from them if it appears right to do so.
Article 4 of the Constitution empowers the Chief Justice to create divisions of the High Court. A Commercial Court has been thus created. When the Chief Justice created a Fast Track Court , as a high tech division of the High Court aimed at dealing expeditiously with selected cases, its constitutionality was tested in the Supreme Court. Tsatsu Tsikata v. Attorney-General [Civil Motion No. It appears, though, that in practice, they are becoming as slow as the traditional courts.
The Constitution also allows for the creation of Regional Tribunals, whose membership may include non-lawyers. The system of law reporting leaves a lot to be desired. The official reporters are often tardy and there was a period when cases were merely reported in digest form and not in full text. Since , another unofficial reporter has appeared exclusively for Supreme Court decisions.
There is no comprehensive index to Ghanaian case law. Each volume of the Ghana Law Reports has a subject-matter index, an index of cases cited and judicially noticed as well as statutes and subsidiary legislation judicially noticed. The editors of the Ghana Law Reports have, from time to time, published cumulative indexes. Presently, there are cumulative indexes covering and The following reporters are available for both modern and colonial cases:.
Article 11 2 of the Constitution identifies the common law as a source of law in Ghana. The common law is defined to include the rules generally known as the common law, the rules generally known as the doctrines of equity and the rules of customary law including those determined by the Superior Court of Judicature.
This is a reference to the judge-made law that propelled the English legal system and those of its colonies. In , by Section 61 of P. Law 42, the revolutionary government clearly modified the force of colonial legislation as follows:. This is a reference to the English doctrines of equity as they have evolved in England and Ghana. Article 11 3 of the Constitution defines customary law as the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities. Customary law is now a question of law to be determined by the courts.
In Muslim communities, the reference to customary law is a reference to Islamic law or the Sharia. Customary law is not codified. Although dated, they remain a good foundation to build on. Among other things, the earlier article provides an index to the abbreviations used in Ghanaian legal literature. The Cardiff Index to Legal Abbreviations , which covers the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions, including Ghana, is a useful supplement to that effort.
Below is an index to some of the most popular abbreviations found in Ghanaian legal literature, in alphabetical order:. Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Decree. Acts of the Constituent Assembly. Court of Appeals.
Constitutional Instrument. Current Cases. Divisional and Full Court Judgments. Selected Judgments of the Divisional Courts. Executive Instrument. Full Court Judgments. Gyandoh, S. A Sourcebook of the Constitutional Law of Ghana. Ghana Law Reports. Ghana Law Reports Digest.
King-Farlow Gold Coast Judgments. Legislative Instrument. Legislative Notice. National Liberation Council Decree. National Redemption Council Decree. Provisional National Defence Council Law. Renner Gold Coast Reports. Review of Ghana Law. Sarbah Fanti Customary Law. Sarbah Fanti Law Reports. Supreme Court. Supreme Court of Ghana Law Reports. Supreme Military Council Decree.
University of Ghana Law Journal. West African Law Reports. Presently, there are only three reliable legal periodicals in Ghana. The older two are indexed in the Index to Foreign Legal Periodicals. All three are also available, electronically, through Datacenta. These periodicals are:. The following are legal periodicals that also show a decided interest in Ghanaian legal literature:. Sections 13 and 14 of the same statute empower the Council, by legislative instrument, to prescribe regulations for establishing a system of legal education.
Graduates of these programs are awarded an LL. In order to be admitted to practice law, however, all of these graduates are required to undertake a two-year professional law course at the Ghana Law School, after which they become eligible for a Barrister-at-Law certificate. To obtain this certificate, one must satisfactorily complete a course in customary law.
To be enrolled as a lawyer, one has to demonstrate to the General Legal Council that they are of good moral character. Since , only persons with at least an undergraduate degree may be enrolled as lawyers. The General Legal Council is the statutory body regulating the profession. The legal profession in Ghana does not observe the dichotomy between solicitors and barristers, inspired by the common law.
Section 2 of the Legal Profession Act, Act 32 as amended, allows an individual enrolled as a lawyer to practice as a solicitor and a barrister, to be an officer of the court and to sue for and recover his fees. The Ghana Bar Association is the sole professional association for lawyers in Ghana.
Although not the creature of statute, it is recognized even by the Constitution. Article 75 of the Constitution grants the President the power to conclude treaties subject to ratification by an Act of Parliament or a resolution of Parliament supported by more than one-half of all members of Parliament. She is also a signatory to many economic development and human rights conventions. Ghana has signed bilateral treaties with other countries. There is no official or unofficial collection or compilation of treaties to which Ghana is a party.
To discover multilateral treaties in force in Ghana, one may consult the Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General. New York: United Nations, Ghana has two official daily newspapers, namely, the Daily Graphic and the Ghanaian Times. Each of these has weekly companion publications, the Mirror and the Weekly Spectator, respectively. There are also several private daily and weekly newspapers. The better ones all have a web presence or online editions.
You can access online versions of Ghanaian newspapers through their links on Ghanaweb. The Constitution Since the first republican Constitution in , Ghana has had three other Constitutions. Legislation and Legislative History Ghana is a unitary state with a unicameral legislature. Official Compilations and Session Laws of Ghana During the colonial regime, the government, from time to time, would publish consolidated statutes in force as of a certain date. Roworth, Accra: Government Printer, No, National Liberation Council Decrees.
Accra: State Publishing Corp. No , Accra: Ghana Publishing Corp, Acts of the Supreme Military Council. Accra: Ghana Publishing Corp. Laws of Ghana Revised Edition , Unofficial Compilations of Laws Datacenta is the only note-worthy unofficial publisher of Ghanaian legislation.
Subsidiary or Subordinate Legislation The Constitution classifies subsidiary legislation as part of the laws of Ghana. Accra: Government Printer, Ghana Gazette. Unofficial Sources of Subsidiary Legislation Datacenta again offers the best access to subsidiary legislation in Ghana.
Case Law Ghana, being a common law jurisdiction, case law and judicial precedent play an important role in the law and its development. Index to Case law There is no comprehensive index to Ghanaian case law. Official Law Reports The following reporters are available for both modern and colonial cases: Current Cases. Lagos, Nigeria: Federal Government Printer, Accra: Council for Law Reporting, Selected Judgments of the Full Courts. Achimota: West Africa Law Publishing, Accra: Datacenta electronic resource.
King-Farlow Gold Coast Judgments Sarbah, John Mensah. Fanti Customary Law. London: W. Clowes, Fanti Law Reports. Clowes, Woodman, Gordon R. Accra: General Legal Council of Ghana, Common Law in Ghana Article 11 2 of the Constitution identifies the common law as a source of law in Ghana. The Rules Generally Known as Common Law This is a reference to the judge-made law that propelled the English legal system and those of its colonies.
Customary Law Article 11 3 of the Constitution defines customary law as the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities. Acts of the Constituent Assembly C. Court of Appeals C. Constitutional Instrument C. Current Cases D. Divisional and Full Court Judgments D.
Executive Instrument F. Full Court Judgments G. Ghana Law Reports G. Ghana Law Reports Digest K. Legislative Instrument L. Legislative Notice N. National Liberation Council Decree N. National Redemption Council Decree P. Renner Gold Coast Reports R. Review of Ghana Law Sar. Sarbah Fanti Customary Law Sar. Sarbah Fanti Law Reports S. Supreme Court S.
Supreme Military Council Decree U. University of Ghana Law Journal W. The Law of Interpretation in Ghana. Accra: Advanced Legal Publications, Daniels, William C. Common Law in West Africa. London: Butterworths, Daniels, Williams C. Essays in Ghanaian Law. Legon: Faculty of Law, University of Ghana, Ghana Law Reform Commission. Accra: The Commission, Harvey, William B. Law and Social Change in Ghana. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Mensa-Bonsu, Henrietta J.
Redwar, Henry W. Sarbah, John M. The Writings of John Mensah Sarbah. Bristol: Thoemes, The Contribution of the Courts to Government. The Evolution of Parliament in Ghana. Rev ed.
The trial judge rejected the mere denial of the appellant. Based on this evidence or the totality of the evidence the trial judge rejected the mere denial of the appellant. I think the trial judge was in his rights to reject that denial because the appellant did not offer any reasonable and acceptable explanation for his role or acts in the false representations contained in Exhibits A and B.
In conclusion I am satisfied that the conviction of the appellant on counts 5, 6 and 7 is proper. I accordingly dismiss the appeal on count 5, 6 and 7. Contrary to section A 3 a of the Criminal Code, Act The appellant and Victor Selormey also faced the substantive offence of willfully causing financial loss to the state contrary to section A 3 a of the Criminal Code Act 29 in counts 2 and 4 relating to the USD , The particulars of these 2 charges are stated in the same words except that the amount of money stated in them differs.
The particulars of count 2 states:. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to the evidence of Mr. In the view of counsel for the appellant this means the Government had custody of the amounts that had been allegedly lost to the state. Therefore there has been no financial loss to the state. In the view of learned counsel for the appellant, by the Government freezing the account it brought the moneys in the account under its control and cannot claim that it had lost that money.
The prosecution, he contends did not prove that the Government had lost the funds transferred into the account of Dr Frederick Owusu Boadu. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that on the basis of these facts the trial judge should have acquitted and discharged the appellant on counts 2 and 4 especially since the appellant was not shown to have made any representation to Ecobank in connection with the transfer of the USD , Willfully causing financial loss to the state.
In the case of The Republic v. Ibrahim Adam and 4 others supra. His Lordship D. Afreh J. He cited and analyzed a plethora of judicial authorities foreign and local and finally summed up the essential elements of the offence of wilfully causing financial loss to the state at page 21 of the judgment under section A 3 a of Act 29 as follows:.
These essential ingredients of the offence of wilfully causing financial loss to the State were confirmed and accepted by the court of appeal when that case went on appeal to the court of appeal. The major ground which has been canvassed on behalf of the appellant in the instant case is that because the Government has frozen the account of Dr.
Another limb of the contention that there has been no financial loss has the basis in the fact that part of that money has been used to buy treasury bills is earning income I find it extremely difficult to appreciate the force of that argument that there was no financial loss in this case to the Government.
With all due respect I am unable to accept the argument of learned counsel for the appellant because as the Chief Stats Attorney has contented rightly in my view the fact that the Government has frozen that account of Dr. Boadu does not give ownership of that money or any ownership right over that money and its proceeds income if any to the Government. Even though the account has been frozen Dr. Boadu still remains the owner of that money and its proceeds if any. Since the Government has not confiscated that account or the money in that account, the Government still has no ownership right over that money.
The account is frozen or the person is on interdiction pending the occurrence of an event such as pending the completion of investigations into the opening and operation of that account or pending the completion of investigations into the conduct or acts of the person interdicted. That is why when a person is interdicted he continues to receive half salary until the interdiction is lifted. So interdiction does not mean dismissal or termination of employment of the person interdicted.
Similarly when the Government freezes the account of somebody that person can make withdrawals from that account, of cause with the permission of the Government; this is the situation which normally happens following military take over of the Government. The reason is simply that mere freezing of the account does not automatically or legally confer ownership right over that account to the Government.
Boadu those amounts are a loss to the State. The Government cannot have access to these moneys without putting in place a legal process for that purpose. There is even evidence on record indicating that Dr. Boadu instructed Ecobank to make substantial disbursements from the transferred amounts. Exhibit C again indicates that Dr.
Also, according to PW1 Dr. Boadu instructed Ecobank to purchase treasury bills with the balance in the account? All these pieces of evidence go to show that Dr. Boadu started exercising ownership rights over these amounts almost immediately after the lodgments of that money into his account at Ecobank. It has also been insistently contented on behalf of the appellant that the appellant did not make any false representation to anybody because he did not write Exhibits A and B.
I think this submission flies in the face of Mrs. So the question is when the appellant used these words in his first letter to Victor Selormey when he knew that Exhibit G-the contract was not a feasibility study was that not a false representation?
Did the appellant not foresee or could he not have foreseen the consequences of that false representation. Fred Owusu Boadu conducted was not a feasibility study and therefore that his said act would cause or probably contribute to cause a financial loss of those amounts to the state. Did the appellant not foreseen or could he not have foresee that loss as the probable consequences of his act and yet he nevertheless took that unreasonable risk. Can it not be reasonably inferred that he intended or desired to cause financial loss to the state.
The appellant was therefore properly convicted of the offences in counts 2 and 4. I accordingly dismiss the appeal on these counts. Finally I deal with the appeal on grounds e and j of the appeal. Under these two grounds the complaint of the appellant is that the sentence imposed on him is unreasonable, excessive and totally unsupported by the facts and the evidence and that the trial judge erred in refusing to give reasons for imposing the maximum custodial sentence on him.
It is trite law that the question of sentence is within the discretion of the trial court or Judge, except were the offence provides expressly its own penalty. In the case of Kwashie ie v. The appellant was sentenced to ten 10 years imprisonment on each counts 1,2,3 and 4 also 10yearsHL on each counts 5,6 and 7 without a fine. The sentence was therefore within the sentencing limits of the trial judge.
Looking at the maximum sentence of ten years for willfully causing financial loss to the state and the maximum sentence of 25 years for the offence defrauding by false pretence I think that the sentence of 10 IHL imposed on the appellant which was to run concurrently, was not too excessive, and unreasonable in the circumstances. In any case the court takes judicial notice of the fact that the appellant has since received a Presidential reprieve for the remaining part of his sentence having already served about sixteen 16 months of his sentence.
Besides it has not been shown that the trial judge exercised his discretion wrongly or improperly in his imposition of that sentence on the appellant. The appeal is accordingly dismissed on the grounds e and j of the appeal. In conclusion the appeal against the conviction and sentence if the appellant on each of the seven courts is dismissed. The 2nd Accused died in the course of the trial but the trial proceeded and the appellant was convicted on all the charges and sentenced to Ten Years I.
It is against the conviction and sentence that the appellant has appealed to this Court. I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of my two senior brothers. I am of the view that there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt before the trial court to warrant the conviction and sentencing of the appellant. I share and associate myself with the views expressed by my brother Justice Kanyoke that the appeal has no merit and must be dismissed. It is necessary to set out the facts on which appellant was tried and convicted.
Three accounts were opened at Ecobank for this programmed. The first account was one in which the main funds to assist non traditional exporters was lodged. The second account was to receive repayments from the exporters and the third was an account in which interests were paid.
It was argued for the appellant that by freezing the accounts of Dr Frederick Boadu, the Government brought the monies under its control so the Government cannot claim that it had lost any money. It must be noted that the government lost the use of the money immediately it left its authorized accounts and entered that of Dr Frederick Boadu.
Frederick Boadu was contracted to do. It is true Pw9 concluded at page that the report Dr Frederick Boadu submitted was not a feasibility report. He had at the previous page testified that:. The figures he gave relate to the undertaken, which was the preparation of the feasibility report.
The figures did not relate tot e proposals which Pw4 had earlier testified that they were not to be paid for. The third ground of appeal was that the trial judge failed to consider the defence of the appellant. It is true that after stating that he did not believe the evidence of the appellant the trial judge should have gone on to consider whether his defence was reasonably probable and his quilt proved beyond reasonable doubt. The appellants defence was a mere denial of the offences with a proviso that he recommended to the 2nd Accused to pay for a proposal.
As the appellants defence had been shattered by his own witness there was no alternative defence for the trial judge to consider. There is evidence that the TIP 1 account were to be used solely for lending to non traditional exporters and that it was the interest account TIP 3 which was to be used for ancillary purposes.
The appellant had all along conspired with the 2nd Accused and he is equally guilty. It is for these and the other reasons given by my learned brother that I find that there were sufficient evidence before the trial judge to justify the conviction and sentence of the appellant. I had the opportunity a day or two ago, to read the elaborate decision just delivered by my elder brother Kanyoke, JA, which has been concurred by my brother Acquaye, JA.
While I appreciate the industry he exhibited in that judgment, I do not share his conclusions that the judgment of the Court below was impeccable and should therefore not be disturbed. I sincerely believe that the judgment of the Court below was flawed and should not be made to stand.
I proceed to give my reasons for saying so. The appellant herein, Mr. On the 14th day of October , he was charged together with the late Mr. Victor Selormey who was also a Deputy Minister of Finance under the same government, before the Fast Track High Court on seven 7 counts of conspiracy to commit crime, to wit; willfully causing financial loss to the State and defrauding by false pretences and the substantive offences of willfully causing financial loss to the State and defrauding by false pretences respectively; contrary to sections 23 1 , A 3 a and of the Criminal Offenses Act, [Act 29] of The appellant was the 1st accused while the late Victor Selormey was the 2nd accused in the Court below.
They all pleaded not guilty to the charges but as fate would have it, Mr. Selormey who was the 2nd accused A2 in the case, did not survive the trial. He died at a time he was supposed to call evidence in support of his defence. This was after the Court below had dismissed a submission of no case made on their behalf by their lawyers and had called on them to open their defence. His side of the whole story was therefore not told.
The appellant appealed to this Court against the refusal of the submission of No case to answer in the court below but this Court threw him out and ordered him to go back to the court below to open his defence. The trial High Court, after a full trial which spanned a period of about four and a half years, found the appellant who was then the only accused person in the case guilty on all the seven 7 counts of conspiracy, willfully causing financial loss to the State and defrauding by false pretences and convicted him accordingly on the 5th day of February He was sentenced to a prison term of ten 10 years IHL on each of the seven counts to run concurrently.
The appellant has appealed to this Court against his conviction and sentence. He filed his notice of appeal on 6th February ; i. He later amended his grounds of appeal with the leave of this Court on 28th January by adding further grounds of appeal. The grounds of appeal that form the basis of this appeal were numbered by the appellant in his statement of case or submissions as follows: -. The judge erred in law when he failed to consider the evidence of some of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the evidence of PW 9 whose evidence was crucial to the determination of the issues.
The judge erred in law when he completely failed to consider the case for the defence including the evidence of witnesses called by the defence. The sentence imposed on the accused is unreasonable, excessive, baseless and totally unsupported by the facts and the evidence adduced at the trial. In respect of the charge of fraud by false pretences, contrary to section of the Criminal Code, Act 29 , the trial judge erred in failing to realize that there was absolutely no evidence of any representation made by the appellant to Ecobank on the basis of which it acted.
Fred Owusu Boadu when the evidence of the prosecution clearly showed that the designation was irrelevant to making the payments. The trial judge erred in not providing reasons for relying on certain evidence of the prosecution when such evidence was contradicted by other evidence of the prosecution.
The trial judge erred in refusing to give reasons for imposing the maximum custodial sentence on the appellant. In stating that he disbelieved the defence of the appellant without more and proceeding to convict the appellant on the evidence of the prosecution, the learned trial judge, in effect, shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution onto the appellant, thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice.
Though counsel for the appellant, in his detailed written submissions, tackled the grounds of appeal separately, with the exception of grounds e and j , which he rightly lumped up together, it appears to me that all the other grounds of appeal raise issues of fact and in some few cases, mixed law and fact. I, however, choose to tackle the ground s that deal with the offences under counts 5, 6 and 7; i. Before I make any attempt to refer to and analyze or scrutinize the submissions of both the appellant and that of the respondent on this ground, I think it would make sense, particularly for clarity of thought, to reproduce the charges leveled against the appellant and the deceased A2 on this issue of conspiracy and fraud by false pretences, which fall under counts 5, 6 and 7 on the Charge Sheet presented to the Court below and then the provisions of the law as contained under sections 23 1 and of the Criminal Offences Act under which the appellant was charged.
Conspiracy to commit crime namely; defrauding by false pretences contrary to section 23 1 and section of the Criminal Code , Act Defrauding by false pretences contrary to section of the Criminal Code , Act Sections 23 1 and of the Criminal Offences Act, , Act 29 on Conspiracy and Defrauding by false pretences also provide:. The offence of defrauding by false pretences could only be committed by a person against another person either through false representation made to that person or personation; with intent to defraud.
I shall revisit this issue. The amount was to be used to develop and promote export of non-traditional goods. The appellant and the late Victor Selormey who was the second accused in the court below A2 , were the joint-chairmen of a committee that was formed to see to the implementation of the programme.
An audit inspection revealed that some irregular disbursements were being made from this TIP fund with Ecobank Limited. A Special Audit Task Force on the Pay Service was therefore mandated to conduct investigations into the disbursement of the funds. Since the appellant and the late Victor Selormey both pleaded not guilty to all the charges, the prosecution i. This burden which is cast upon the prosecution in all criminal trials at all times is not discharged any how.
The law has set down a standard upon which the burden is discharged. According to P. The accused has no burden of proving his innocence. This is trite learning under the law on crime so I would not waste time on what constitutes reasonable doubt. However, I wish to stress and with much importance that this duty to prove charges leveled against another beyond reasonable doubt is a standard one. The principles that underlie this duty and how it has to be accomplished are the same.
In this appeal, the appellant has urged this Court to conclude that the prosecution did not lead sufficient evidence to establish the ingredients of the offence of defrauding by false pretences and then conspiracy to defraud by false pretences against him so it was wrong for the court below to have convicted him on counts 5, 6 and 7. According to the appellant, the charges under counts 5, 6 and 7 indicate that the appellant and the late Victor Selormey acted together with a Dr.
Frederick Owusu Boadu and persons unknown with a common purpose to defraud the State through false pretences. However, the prosecution did not lead any evidence to prove the most essential ingredient of the offence of defrauding by false pretences, which is that the appellant had made a representation which he knew to be false and which representation another person relied on to part with an item to the appellant or a third person, which he would otherwise not have done.
According to the appellant, he should not even have been called upon to make a defence under these counts. The appellant referred to the testimony of P. Akaba from Ecobank, and submitted that there was nothing in Mr. Frederick Owusu Boadu because of any false representation made to his Managing Director by the appellant as was contained on the charge sheet. The prosecution, in its written submissions in reply, rebuffed this argument and also quoted the testimony of P.
The respondent then submitted as follows: -. From the above quoted submission made by the respondent, there is no doubt to the fact that the respondent admits that the alleged false representation made to the M. Victor Selormey who was the 2nd accused A2 in the Court below. What that decision says simply is that if there is evidence before the trial judge which the trial judge accepts to ground a conviction, an appeal court would not interfere with that conviction.
I agree totally with the respondent on this principle, which is also applicable in civil trials where an appellate court is not supposed to interfere with findings of facts made by a trial court if those findings are supported by evidence before the trial court. This principle is based on the basic legal norm that no person could be convicted on a crime without any evidence supporting the charge.
So, if from the totality of the evidence before the trial court, there is no evidence on which the conviction of the accused on the charge s preferred could be based but the trial court nevertheless proceeded to convict, then an appeal court would be shirking its responsibility if it fails to interfere. As the respondent rightly quoted in its written submission against this appeal, Van Lare, J. Van Lare, J. If the trial judge decides to accept evidence that has no weight to ground conviction under the law; i.
The charges under counts 6 and 7 indicate that the appellant and the late Victor Selormey did represent to the Managing Director of Ecobank that a Dr. The essential ingredients that the prosecution was required to establish before succeeding on these two charges of defrauding by false pretences were:. The prosecution has to prove all three ingredients if it has to succeed as the failure to prove any one of the above ingredients is fatal to its case.
In the instant case the respondent was required under the law to produce credible evidence before the Court below to prove that the appellant and the late Victor Selormey made a false representation to somebody and by means of that false representation, which they made with intend to defraud, they obtained the consent of that person to part with or transfer the ownership of property, the subject-matter of the charge.
In my view, the respondent failed miserably to discharge its responsibility in this regard and the court below should have dismissed the charges against the appellant under counts 5, 6 and 7. In fact no such feasibility study was ever conducted by the said Dr. Fred Boadu causing financial loss to Ghana Government. From what I have stated above, the counts of defrauding by false pretences have been established by the prosecution witnesses. In the first place, P. Again, the evidence on record did not suggest in any way that Ecobank Gh Limited was holding the TIP accounts as the agent of the Government of Ghana as the Court below concluded.
Even granted that Mr. Selormey did make such representation, as the trial court contended in its judgment, which was not the case anyway, there was no evidence from the prosecution that established that it was Mr. Selormey and the appellant who made that representation to the Managing Director of Ecobank.
In fact, there was no such evidence before the lower court. However, if I understood the Court below very well, the argument was that since Mr. Selormey, then the representation the late Mr. I want to make it clear at this point that the Court below, in its judgment, did not make mention of any earlier letter written by the appellant to the late Mr. I do not think so.
Boadu to prepare so he was authorizing the final payment in accordance with the terms of the consultancy agreement. What does the contract talk about? The evidence before the court below as is contained in the record of appeal is overwhelming that the 2nd accused in the Court below, the late Mr.
Selormey wrote to Ecobank as the person in charge of that account for and on behalf of the government, directing Ecobank to release funds from that account for the payment of the contract. The decision to release monies from that account to pay for the contract was therefore that of the 2nd accused the late Mr. Victor Selormey who was then in charge of that account. The appellant had nothing to do with that decision.
At least, the evidence on record did not establish that the appellant was part of the decision that decided to pay for the consultancy services from that particular account. The claim therefore that the appellant and the late Mr. Victor Selormey used their positions as joint-chairmen of the Oversight Committee to fraudulently disburse funds from this TIP account, which was an allegation contained in P.
I quote below a few of his answers during cross-examination by counsel for the appellant, which appear at pages of the record of proceedings:. On page 1 of your Audit report particularly the second paragraph, there is a whole narration as to what the TIP Fund is supposed to be for. Can you tell this court the source of your information? That is where you got all this information.
I am putting it to you that the information contained in paragraph 2 is wrong. Is that not it? You said that you conducted your audit in accordance with International Accounting and Auditing Standard. Does it also include having to invite the person who is being audited for his comments? My Lord, I was not auditing any particular person. I was auditing the TIP Funds but not human beings. Baffour Awuah, you have produced a report touching and concerning two people who are standing trial here.
You said that you conducted your audit in accordance with International Accounting and Auditing Standards and this is your document. My question is, would this International Accounting and Auditing Standard, also include having to invite the persons who are the subject of the audit for their comments? If the people involved were in office, I would have invited or visited them.
If I make an effort to find them and I cannot get them, there is nothing I can do. Did you indicate in your report that you made efforts to contact them but you were unsuccessful? Is it anywhere in your report? In the first place, from the record of proceedings before the Court, the narration that P. He himself conceded and said he did not know that it was wrong. This means that P.
How can the product of such a shoddy start be accurate? Throughout the evidence led by the prosecution or the respondent, it was not established that Mr. Victor Selormey did not have any authority to order for the payment of the contract from that account. Frederick Owusu Boadu purportedly for a feasibility study he had purportedly prepared while in fact and in deed he never prepared any feasibility study. This means that if Mr. From the evidence on record, the appellant never on any occasion made any representation to the M.
If the appellant made any representation at all, then it was to the 2nd accused Mr. Selormey but not to the M. So seriously speaking, the prosecution woefully failed to establish that the appellant ever made any representation to the Managing Director of Ecobank that Dr. Fred Owusu Boadu had conducted a feasibility study for which he should be paid any monies, which said representation made Ecobank to transfer the said amount and which said representation the appellant knew to be false but nevertheless made it with the intent to defraud.
There is no such evidence before the trial court for the trial judge to have come to that conclusion. Even quite apart from that, the important question that the trial court should have asked itself is; who is the victim of this alleged fraud? Is it the Managing Director of Ecobank to whom the alleged false representation was made or is it the State that owned the money in Ecobank?
It cannot be the Managing Director of Ecobank because the property that was parted with did not belong to him. He did not therefore part with the ownership of anything to his detriment. From the record of appeal, the M.
He did not testify at all. The only evidence called by the prosecution to support these charges of defrauding by false pretences was the testimony of P. As counsel for the appellant rightly argued in his written submissions, Mr. Akabah never stated anywhere in his evidence that the appellant ever made any representation to his Managing Director, not even to mention the falsity of any such representation, that made Ecobank to release the funds concerned.
What P. Akabah said was that the only letters that were addressed to the Managing Director of his Bank Ecobank , i. Victor Selormey A2. According to him, his bank never dealt with the appellant. However, the fact that they were copied to him did not mean that he had a hand in their authorship. Akabah P. Selormey that made the bank, of which he is the Operational Manager, to release the funds but because of the fact that the signature under the letter was operative.
He added that the bank was bound to pay as it had no right to challenge the authority of the 2nd accused the late Victor Selormey with regard to the operation of the account in question. It was the late Mr. Incidentally, the prosecution did not establish in any way, from the entire record of appeal that I have seen and read, that Mr.
Victor Selormey had no authority to operate or order payments from that account. Though allegations were made initially that he did not consult other institutions that should have been drawn into the picture, the evidence before the court below and in the record of appeal suggests that Mr. Victor Selormey A2 was in fact the Government representative responsible for the operation of this account and he needed not to consult anybody before doing so. So if the victim of the alleged fraud by false pretences is not the Managing Director of Ecobank, then who is this victim?
Is it the Government of Ghana as the charge sheet appears to tell? The charge is that the appellant made representations to the M. I have stated earlier on in this judgment that it is only a person against whom the offence of defrauding by false pretences could be committed and I added that I would re-visit this issue. I now proceed to do so. From this definition, the offender and the victim must all be persons.
They could either be physical persons homo sapiens or legal persons, i. This means that the Republic of Ghana or the State could also be a victim of the offence of defrauding by false pretences. However, the particulars of the charges do not indicate that the alleged false representation was made to the Republic of Ghana.
According to the particulars, the false representation was made to the M. The question is; how was this consent of the Government of Ghana obtained? I have already indicated supra that the M. It was his Operations Manager who testified as P. The testimony of P. Fred Owusu Boadu because of any false representation made to his M. Selormey since he was responsible for the operation of the accounts. Selormey who authorized the payments had authority to do so as the representative of the Government in charge of the account involved and he did that alone without the involvement of the appellant.
That was the unambiguous testimony of P. Again, I want to emphasize that the Managing Director of Ecobank could not be described as the agent of the Government or the State with regard to the custody of the money in the account in question as the Court below wrongly did. What the trial court failed to appreciate is the fact that it was the representative of the Government of Ghana responsible for the operation of the Ecobank account, in the person of the late Mr.
Selormey A2 , who was the Deputy Minister of Finance at the time, was responsible for the operation of the account on behalf of the government. The evidence on record is very clear on that. So Mr. Selormey was in fact, the agent or the representative of the Government then in charge of the account at Ecobank.
Is the prosecution saying that he Mr. In fact, the offence of defrauding by false pretences does not arise at all in the circumstances of this case. If it is the case of the prosecution that the late Mr. Victor Selormey misapplied the TIP accounts when he ordered for the payment of the contract the appellant entered into with Dr. Boadu from that account, as the prosecution seemed to suggest as part of its case, then Mr.
In such a case, he could be held for misapplying the funds. The offence of defrauding by false pretences could not therefore hold against him. As for the appellant, he never made any representation at all to the M. The only representation he made as the Minister of Trade was to Mr. If the prosecution thought the representation the appellant made to Mr. Selormey to authorize the payment of the amount in issue from the Ecobank account, then the appellant alone should have been charged for defrauding Mr.
Selormey by false pretences because it was to him that the appellant made a representation. He never made any representation to the M. The appellant had no authority under any law or statute to order Ecobank to release any monies from the TIP account and he never did any such thing for whatever purpose, as the evidence on record clearly discloses. So in my candid view, the trial court erred when it came to the conclusion that the charges of defrauding by false pretences under counts 6 and 7 have been proved by the prosecution against the appellant.
This was a fundamental error, which should not be made to stand. On the charge of Conspiracy under count 5, the appellant was said to have acted together with the late Victor Selormey, Dr. Fred Owusu Boadu and other unknown persons to defraud the State. The defrauding is the alleged representation made to the M. Under our law, conspiracy is committed when two or more persons agree or act together with a common purpose for or in committing or abetting a crime.
The offence is in two legs. Firstly, an accused could be charged with the offence of conspiracy if it is found out that he agreed with another person or others with a common purpose for or in committing or abetting a crime though he did not eventually partake in the commission of the crime. In the instant appeal before us, the appellant was said to have acted together with the late Mr.
Victor Selormey, Dr. The particulars did not say that they agreed or had any previous agreement. By these particulars of the charge, it is being alleged that the appellant partook in the act of defrauding by false pretences; i. Having concluded that the substantive charge of defrauding by false pretences under counts 6 and 7 could not hold against the appellant, the charge of conspiracy under count 5 also fails as a matter of course as no evidence was led to establish that.
Surprisingly, the trial court said nothing about the charge of Conspiracy to Defraud under count 5 in its entire judgment. Throughout the whole judgment, the trial court was silent on the charge under count 5. It did not diagnose that charge in any way so there was no conclusion that the appellant was guilty under count 5 throughout the judgment of the court below. There was no mention of it at all in the judgment, the reason being that no evidence was led to establish same.
It was therefore wrong for the trial court to have convicted the appellant on that charge also. I do not find this argument appealing. Section is explicit that it is the trial court that has to decide whether in its view, there was a case for the accused person to answer or not. It states: -. In the instant case, since the prosecution contended in the facts presented to the Court below that the contract for which Dr.
Boadu was paid the amount in question was unknown to people who should have known about it and that even the Coordinator in charge of the Gateway Project in the person of Dr. George Sipah Yankey had told the police that he did not know anything about it, there was the need to invite the appellant to also tell his side of the story. I have to emphasize, however, that the yardstick that is used in determining whether the prosecution has established a prima facie case or not is not the same as the one used in determining whether the prosecution has established its case against an accused person beyond reasonable doubt.
They are two different things. In deciding either to call on an accused person to open a defence or not, the trial court is not supposed to make findings of fact. Findings of fact are made when the trial court is considering the guilt or otherwise of an accused person at the close of the case for the prosecution and the defence. The same court that comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has established a prima facie case can also come to the conclusion that the prosecution could not establish its case beyond reasonable doubt when it comes to the consideration of the totality of the evidence before the court.
This is not because the offence itself is controversial but because of the hell that was raised about it when it was applied against certain important personalities in the society, including the appellant in this case. This offence of causing financial loss to the State; i. From the line of arguments of some of its antagonists, the false impression being created in the mind of the public is that, under section A 3 a , a public servant or official is summarily guilty of a crime whenever he takes part in a decision that involves the disbursement of funds from the public purse that turns out to be uneconomical to the State.
It is not correct, to say the least that, that is the intention of the law. The law is more concerned with the way or manner in which the loss was occurred; i. The statute or law says that the loss to the State must have been caused willfully or maliciously or fraudulently before there can be criminal liability.
The section reads: -. The law only seeks to do away with the culture of impunity and to restore into society the ethics of discipline, honesty, responsibility and professionalism in the discharge or management of public business. Section A 3 a is not therefore vague as some people perceive it to be. In my view, it is very progressive and one of the best legislative acts of the first Parliament of the Fourth Republic.
It is for the courts to clothe it proactively with its rightful garment as the legislature intended it to be, but not to masquerade it to appear monstrous as some people already perceive it to be in order to hang it to the benefit of a few and to the detriment of the larger community of Ghana.
He could not have concluded otherwise. He then summed up the essential elements or ingredients of the offence of causing financial loss under section A 3 a as follows: -. That the financial loss was caused through the action or the omission of the accused; and. Before the appellant could therefore be convicted of the offence of causing financial loss contrary to section A 3 a , all the four ingredients listed above must be proved.
It must be proved that the State has occasioned a financial loss; that the loss was caused through the action or inaction of the appellant and that the appellant intended or desired to cause the loss; or he foresaw the loss as virtually certain but took unjustifiable risk of it; or he foresaw the loss as the probable consequence of his act and took an unreasonable risk of it; or if he had used reasonable caution and observation, it would have appeared to him that his act or inaction, would probably cause or contribute to cause the loss.
Though the court below concluded that all the above ingredients were proved by the prosecution against the appellant and gave reasons why it thought so at pages 14 and 15 of the judgment, which I shall come to later, the Court below did not indicate clearly how these ingredients were allegedly established or proved against the appellant.
As I have posited earlier on, all the grounds of appeal, with the exception of e and j , are subsumed under ground a ; i. Boadu when in fact Dr. Boadu had done no such work to merit the payment. Before concluding that the appellant and the late Victor Selormey did commit the offence of causing financial loss to the state, this was what the Court below said in its judgment at page 14 and -.
Fred Owusu Boadu with copies to the 1st accused and Dr. The total amount paid into Dr. The prosecution led evidence to show that Dr. Fred Owusu Boadu was a financial loss to the State since no work was done by Dr. According to the evidence of P. According to Archibold, willfully is defined as intentionally. Fred Owusu Boadu when no work was done by him Dr. From the above quotation taken from the judgment of the court below, the appellant was found guilty on the offence of causing financial loss to the State by the Court below because;.
Boadu be made from the TIP interest account, which directive the bank complied with;. Boadu had done no work to merit that payment. They had therefore willfully or maliciously or fraudulently caused financial loss to the State. In the first place, the conclusion of the court below that Dr.
Boadu had done no work emphasis mine ; to merit the payment of the amount of money to him was not supported by the evidence on record. The trial court was therefore wrong in coming to that conclusion. The evidence on record as was presented by the respondent was to the effect that Dr.
Boadu did some work but what he did was not what the appellant said he was going to do under the contract. According to the prosecution, the appellant said Dr. Boadu was being paid for a feasibility report he had submitted but it turned out that he did not prepare a feasibility report but a study proposal.
That is the reason why the prosecution charged the appellant with the offence of causing financial loss to the State. I therefore authorize the final payment in accordance with the terms of the Consultancy Service Agreement. The contract that the appellant entered into with Dr.
Boadu therefore becomes very paramount in determining what in fact the Ministry of Trade per the appellant contracted Dr. The contracting parties were the Gateway Secretariat under the auspices of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, which was represented by the appellant and then Dr. Fred Owusu Boadu on the other part, he stated in his testimony that he knew about the Science and Technology Park project.
He was however emphatic that he was not the final authority at the Gateway Project Secretariat. The fact that he did not know anything about the contract as he claimed was therefore not strange. There is no doubt to the fact that Dr. The two were therefore the final authority on the project. He said the contract his Ministry entered into with Dr. Boadu had to submit a study proposal. It was on the basis of the report titled as above, which the appellant said he had received from Dr.
From the nature of the contract and the final report that was submitted to the appellant by Dr. Boadu to do. From the evidence before this Court, there is no doubt about the fact that a Consultancy Contract was entered into between the Ministry of Trade represented by the appellant and Dr.
It was on the basis of this contract that Dr. Boadu, thus causing a loss to the State that owned the funds from which the payment was effected. That conclusion was in fact a fallacy when juxtaposed with the testimony of P.
Meanwhile, in the testimony of P. According to him, the bank could not challenge any directive from the late Victor Selormey for payments from that account since he was the government official operating the account and that a mere direction from the late Victor Selormey to the bank to pay with his signature attached was enough. This evidence from P. This minor and harmless blow from the prosecution managed to catch the trial judge off guard thus confusing him to come to the wrong conclusion he came to.
The sum total of the testimony of Mrs Batsa who testified as D. Instead of considering the testimony of Mrs. Batsa as a whole, the respondent in its submissions, chose to be selective. The respondent selected those portions of her testimony that suited its course and turned a blind eye on other aspects of the same testimony, which when considered together with the other portions, gave a different picture from what was presented by the respondent.
The respondent, in its written submission, tried to make capital out of Mrs. I do not accept this argument as convincing. I find it necessary or expedient to emphasize here that the duty of the prosecution to establish the guilt of an accused is absolute. It does not shift.
So strictly speaking the burden on the appellant to produce satisfactory evidence to rebut that claim did not arise. The appellant was not required under any law to prove his innocence. Batsa for further explanation was therefore unnecessary. However, I do not see the extent to which Mrs. THE STATE  GLR , the Supreme Court held that where a submission of no case is wrongly overruled, the fact that the accused gives incriminating evidence filling the omissions or defects in the case for the prosecution will not change the legal position especially where no offence has been alleged or proved by the prosecution.
The woman was on interdiction when she was subpoenaed to appear before the Court below to testify on events that had happened some four, five or more years back. Though she indicated in her testimony that in the first letter the appellant wrote to her boss; i. Quite apart from the fact that she could not produce this letter which she said was with the police, she admitted that if the letter had been produced in court it would have clarified the issue as to whether she was right or the appellant was right.
To buttress the fact that Mrs. Batsa was not sure of herself was her later assertion that the two phrases; i. To her, the use of the two phrases alternatively was semantical. This later assertion by Mrs. Batsa that the two terms meant the same thing to her raised doubts in Mrs. In any way, a careful reading of the judgment of the Court below suggests clearly that the Court below did not give any consideration at all to the testimonies of the defence witnesses including that of Mrs.
Again, the Court below did not avert its mind to the contents of the contract i. In his judgment, the trial judge said he did not believe the explanation of the appellant in defence. This was what the Court below stated at page 6 of its judgment: -. Short of believing the explanation of the appellant, the trial court did not go on further to find out whether the explanation of the appellant as it stood, was reasonably probable. And even if he did receive them, did he co-author them?
The law is clear that where a court does not believe the story or explanation of an accused person, the court should nevertheless go ahead to consider whether that explanation is reasonably probable, when it is considered together with the evidence on record as a whole.
This is a notorious principle of criminal law when it comes to the establishment of guilt of an accused person. See the cases of R. The Supreme Court in the Lutterodt case laid down three stages that every court has to go through in determining the guilt of an accused. This was what the highest court of the land said:. If it is, that provides complete answer, and the court should then acquit the defendant;.
The prosecution did not lead any evidence to establish that he did receive them contrary to his denial of having received them. This was what the trial judge said at page 10 of his judgment:. The investigator P. Under normal circumstances, in the course of business, when a letter is received by a ministry, it is normally entered in a log book. Again, the appellant denied ever writing to the late Victor Selormey in respect of the contract with Dr.
The court then concluded that it did not believe the appellant without determining whether his explanation that he never used those words was reasonably probable. In fact, the respondent could not produce any evidence to contradict that explanation. Again, from the totality of the evidence before the court below, the prosecution could not establish that the appellant as the Minister of Trade in charge of the Gateway Project had no mandate to enter into any contract with Dr.
The prosecution contended that the contract was sole sourced. However, it led no evidence to establish that the sole sourcing was illegal or the appellant had no authority to sole source the contract. So clearly, there was no reason for the appellant to hide anything in the first place.
Again, the prosecution did not lead any evidence to establish that the contract the appellant entered into with Dr. Fred Owusu Boadu for and on behalf of the Ministry was illegal. According to the prosecution, there were no witnesses to the contract. However, it was not established by the prosecution that all such contracts are to be witnessed as a matter of practice so the failure to procure a witness in this case meant there was something sinister about the motives of the appellant in entering into that contract.
There was no such evidence. Thompson Abubakar Bibilazu who was called by the prosecution to testify on the final report submitted by Dr. This was emphatically stated in the report that was submitted to the Commissioner, C. The report, however, did not state the maximum charge that the document or work could have attracted. In his evidence during cross-examination, P. I think it is important I quote this part of P.
You have stated there that, the fees would range from seventy-five dollars U. In your consultancy fee schedule, you have quite clearly stated that U. It was the final report that was submitted to the appellant by Dr. This report was submitted to P.
Boadu was contracted as an external or off-shore consultant. Boadu had done no work at all to merit the payment of any money to him under the contract. Again, there was no evidence from the respondent, as the record of appeal clearly shows that suggests in the least that the final report that Dr. Boadu submitted to the appellant, which P. Boadu because the terms of reference did not require them to do so. So from the evidence of P. I find it particularly amazing or difficult to understand why the Court below preferred the testimonies of either P.
Fred Owusu Boadu could have charged for the report submitted by Dr. Boadu and the Ministry of Trade was on the higher side. Meanwhile the Court below did not give any reasons for preferring the testimony of P. In my view, the failure to give reasons was a legal error. Boadu turned out to be false. George Sipa Yankey who was the Coordinator of the Gateway Project Secretariat testified that he knew about the contract. The prosecution failed to call him as a witness with the excuse that when they contacted him he said he knew nothing about the contract between the appellant and Dr.
He however testified for the appellant as D. Even P. George Sipah Yankey who was a key person to have been contacted, when he was conducting the audit in the same way as he failed to get in touch with the appellant and the late Mr. As I have already indicated in this judgment, the prosecution could not lead any evidence to establish that the late Victor Selormey had no authority to authorize for the payment of the work done by Dr. Boadu from the TIP accounts with Ecobank.
Even the prosecution suggested that the two misapplied the funds. In answer to a question by counsel for the appellant during cross-examination, P. I quote below the question and answer:. I am putting it to you that the 2nd accused person was never a member of the Gateway Oversight Committee. Subsection 2 A tenant of a house can commit a criminal offence against those provisions by setting fire to the house.
A person commits a criminal offence and is liable to a fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty penalty units, who. A person who causes the safety of an engine, a carriage, or a train on a railway, or of a vessel or an aircraft, to be endangered, with intent to cause harm or danger to a person, commits a first degree felony. A person who unlawfully interferes with or obstructs the working of a lighthouse, beacon, buoy, signal, or any other apparatus or thing which is used or maintained for the safety of navigation, whether on the sea or on a river or any other water or in the air or for the safe working or using of a railway, commits a misdemeanour.
A person convicted of a criminal offence specified in this Chapter is liable to a fine of not less than two hundred and fifty penalty units or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years or to both the fine and the imprisonment. A person who knows of the commission of high treason, or of a treason within the meaning of clause.
A person who sits other than in the public gallery or votes in Parliament knowing or having reasonable grounds for knowing that that person is not entitled to do so commits a criminal offence and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding ten penalty units or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or to both the fine and the imprisonment. A person who does an act or utters words or publishes a writing with intent to insult or bring into contempt or ridicule the official national flag or emblem of Ghana or a representation or pictorial reproduction of the flag or emblem commits a misdemeanour.
A person who is not subject to military law, and who abets an act of insubordination by a person subject to military law, commits a misdemeanour. Where three or more persons meet or are together for the purposes of military training or exercise, without the permission of the President or of an officer or a person authorised by law to give the permission, each of them commits a misdemeanour.
A person who causes a personal harm or procures any other person to cause harm to that person, for the purpose of evading a liability to perform service or duty with the Armed Forces, commits a misdemeanour. A person who takes part in a riot, who is armed with an offensive instrument, commits a second degree felony. A person who unlawfully and with violence obstructs the assembly of any persons who are assembled for a lawful purpose, or disturbs that assembly, or with violence disperses or attempts to disperse that assembly, commits a misdemeanour.
A person who in a public place or at a public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or by which a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, commits a misdemeanour. A person commits perjury, if in a written or verbal statement made or verified by that person on oath before a Court, or a public officer, or before the President or before a commission or committee states anything knowing that the statement is false in a material particular, or which that person does not have a reason to believe is true.
A person may commit perjury by swearing that that person believes a thing which that person does not in fact believe. A person who fabricates evidence, with intent to defeat, obstruct, or pervert the course of justice in a proceeding, commits a criminal offence and is liable to the same penalties as if that person had committed perjury in that proceeding.
A person fabricates evidence if that person causes a circumstance to exist, or makes a false entry in a book, an account, or a record, or makes a document containing a false statement or forges a document, with intent to mislead a public officer, judge or juror acting in a judicial proceeding.
A person who with intent to defeat, obstruct, or pervert the course of justice, or to defraud or injure a person endeavours to deceive a Court, or a judicial officer by personation, or by a false instrument, document, seal, or signature, commits a misdemeanour. A person who knowingly delivers or causes to be delivered to any other person a paper of a character calculated, by reason of the resemblance of that paper to a summons or other process of a Court or tribunal, to deceive commits a misdemeanour.
A person who wilfully causes any other person to disobey any summons, process or order lawfully issued or made for the attendance of that other person as a witness in a judicial proceeding, or for the production by that person of a written order or other evidence in a judicial proceeding, commits a misdemeanour.
A person who with intent to defeat, obstruct, or pervert the course of justice at the trial of a person for a criminal offence, causes any other person to refrain from giving evidence at the trial, commits a misdemeanour. A person who without reasonable excuse defaults in obeying any summons, process or order lawfully issued or made for the attendance of that person as a witness in a judicial proceeding or for the production by that person of a written or any other evidence in a judicial proceeding, commits a misdemeanour.
A person who with intent to prevent, obstruct or delay the taking of an inquest on the body or touching the death of a person, or to defeat the ends of justice, buries or conceals or disposes of the body, commits a misdemeanour. A person commits a misdemeanour who with force, threats, or tumult, hinders, interrupts or disturbs the proceedings of a Court, or wilfully and unlawfully, with force, threat or tumult, hinders a person from entering or quitting a Court, or removes or detains that person in the Court.
A person commits a misdemeanour who in the presence of a Court commits a contempt of court by an insulting, opprobrious or menacing acts or words. A person commits a misdemeanour who, pending proceedings in a Court, publishes in writing or otherwise anything concerning the proceedings or a party to the proceedings, with intent to excite popular prejudice for or against a party to the proceedings. A prison officer who directly or indirectly aids, encourages, induces or facilitates the escape of a person in lawful custody commits a second degree felony.
A person who endeavours by force to prevent the execution of a person sentenced to death commits a second degree felony. A person commits a criminal offence and is liable to a fine not exceeding twenty-five penalty units who. A person compounds a criminal offence if that person offers or agrees to forbear from prosecuting or giving evidence against a person on a criminal charge, in consideration of money, or of a valuable thing, or of a personal advantage or an advantage to any other person.
A person who, without lawful excuse, refuses to serve in a public office in which that person is bound to serve, and for the refusal to serve in which a penalty or punishment is not provided by an enactment, commits a misdemeanour. A person who pretends to be or acts as a public officer, juror, or to be a messenger of or to hold an authority from the President, or a Minister or a Court, and who is not lawfully authorised to act in that capacity, or not holding that authority, and in or under colour of the assumed character does or attempts to do, or procures or attempts to procure, any other person to do or abstain from doing an act commits a misdemeanour, unless that person shows.
A public officer, juror, or voter commits corruption in respect of the duties of office or the vote, if the public officer, juror or voter directly or indirectly, agrees or offers to permit the conduct of that person as a public officer, juror, or voter to be influenced by the gift, promise or prospect of a valuable consideration to be received by that person, or by any other person, from any other person. A person commits the criminal offence of corrupting a public officer, juror, or voter in respect of the duties of office or in respect of the vote, if that person endeavours, directly or indirectly, to influence the conduct of the public officer, juror or voter in respect of the duties of office or in respect of the vote, by the gift, promise or prospect of a valuable consideration to be received by the public officer, juror, or voter, or by any other person, from any other person.
It is immaterial, for the purposes of section or , that the person respecting whose conduct the endeavour, agreement or offer is made is not yet at the time of the making of the endeavour, agreement or offer, a public officer, juror, or voter, if the endeavour, agreement, or offer, a public officer, juror, or voter, if the endeavour, agreement, or offer is made in the expectation that that person will or may become or act as a public officer, a juror, or a voter.
It is immaterial, for the purposes of section , or , whether the act to be done by a person in consideration or in pursuance of the gift, promise, prospect, agreement or offer is criminal or wrongful otherwise than by reason of the provisions of any of those sections. Where, after a person has done an act as a public officer, juror, or voter that person secretly accepts, or agrees or offers secretly to accept for personal gain or for any other person, a valuable consideration on account of the act, that person shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, to have acted corruptly, within the meaning of this Chapter, in respect of that act before the doing of the act.
Where, after a public officer, juror, or voter has done an act as an officer, a juror or voter, any other person secretly agrees or offers to give or to procure for that person or any other person a valuable consideration on account of that act, the person so agreeing or offering shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, to have corrupted, before the doing of the act, that public officer, juror, or voter, in respect of that act.
A public officer or juror commits the criminal offence of wilful oppression in respect of the duties of office if that officer wilfully commits an excess or abuse of authority, to the injury of the public or of any other person.
A public officer commits extortion who, under colour of office, demands or obtains from a person, whether for public purposes or for personal gain, or for any other person money or valuable consideration which the public officer knows is not lawfully authorised or at a time at which the public officer knows is not lawfully authorised to demand or to obtain that money or valuable consideration. A person who, in order to obtain or be qualified to act in a public office or to vote at a public election makes, signs, publishes or uses a declaration, statement or an oath, required by law or a certificate or testimonial regarding conduct or services, or as to any other matter which is material for obtaining that office, or for the qualification to act in that office or to vote at the election, commits a misdemeanour if that person knows that the declaration, statement, oath, certificate or testimonial is false in a material particular.
A public officer commits a misdemeanour who, being bound or authorised as a public officer to attest or certify, by writing or otherwise, a document or matter, or that an event has or has not happened, and. A public officer who intentionally and unlawfully destroys, injures, falsifies or conceals a document which is in the possession, custody, or control of the public officer or to which the public officer has access by virtue of office, commits a misdemeanour.
A person commits a misdemeanour who, with intent to defeat, obstruct, or prevent the course of justice, or the due execution of the law, or evade the requirements of the law, or to defraud or injure a person, or to obtain or assist in or facilitate the obtaining of any passport, instrument, concession, appointment, permission or any other privilege or advantage, endeavours to deceive or to overreach a public officer acting in the execution of a public office or duty,.
A person who, otherwise than in the due execution of duties as a judicial officer or juror, makes or offers to make an agreement with any other person as to the judgment or verdict which that person will or will not give as a judicial officer or juror in a pending or future proceeding, commits a misdemeanour.
A person who, with a purpose of procuring an undue advantage or disadvantage to a party to a judicial proceeding, procures for that person, or for any other person to be summoned, empaneled or sworn as a juror in the proceeding, or endeavours to prevent any other person from being summoned, impanelled or sworn as a juror in that proceeding, commits a misdemeanour. A person who attempts to prevent, obstruct or disturb a public election by a kind of force, violence, or threat or by an act which is a criminal offence punishable under this Act, commits a misdemeanour.
A person who acts in a manner that amounts to corruption, intimidation or personation in respect of a public election, commits a misdemeanour, and shall not, during seven years from the date of the conviction, vote at a public election and shall not hold a public office in respect of which the election was held, or a public office of the same nature.
A person does an act of intimidation at a public election if that person endeavours to influence the conduct of a voter in respect of the election by a threat of an evil consequence to be caused to the voter or to any other person, on account of the conduct as a voter. A person who, as a public officer charged with the counting of votes or the making of a return at a public election, wilfully falsifies the account of the votes or makes a false return commits a second degree felony.
A person shall not be relieved from liability to punishment under this Chapter by reason of an irregularity or informality in the proceedings at, or preliminary or subsequent to, an election. Where a public officer who is bound in that capacity to pay or account for money or valuable things, or to produce or give up documents or any other things, fails as in duty bound to pay or account for, or to produce or give up, to any other officer or person lawfully demanding the same, commits a misdemeanour.
A person who, being unmarried, goes through the ceremony of marriage, whether in Ghana or elsewhere, with another person whom that person knows to be married to another person commits a misdemeanour, whether the other party to the ceremony does or does not have the guilty knowledge as to be convicted of bigamy. A person who, whether in Ghana or elsewhere, goes through the ceremony of marriage, or a ceremony which that person represents to be a ceremony of marriage knowing that the marriage is void and that the other person believes it to be valid, commits a misdemeanour.
A person who personates any other person in marriage, or marries under a false name or description, with intent to deceive the other party to the marriage, commits a misdemeanour. A person who is not duly qualified so to do who performs or witnesses as a marriage officer the ceremony of marriage, or knowing that any of the matters required by law for the validity of a marriage has not happened or been performed, so that the marriage is void or unlawful, commits a misdemeanour. A person who in a declaration, certification, licence, document, or statement required by law to be made or issued for the purpose of a marriage, declares, enters, certifies or states a material matter which that person knows to be false, commits a misdemeanour.
Your email address will not be published. Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. Explanation of unlawful damage. Explanation as to amount of damage. Poisoning or using dynamite in river. A person commits a criminal offence and is liable to a fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty penalty units, who a throws a substance poisonous to fish into a river, stream, or lagoon, in order to poison or stupefy the fish, or b turns or obstructs a river or stream, for the purpose of taking or destroying fish, or c throws a substance poisonous to fish into a part of the sea at the mouth of a river or stream running into the sea, for the purpose of poisoning, stupefying, taking or destroying fish, or d uses dynamite or any other explosive substance to catch or destroy fish in a river, stream, or lagoon, or e uses a mode of catching fish which tends to destroy the fish in a river, stream or lagoon.
Repairs endangering train, vessel or aircraft. Intentionally endangering train, vessel or aircraft. Causing loss, damage or injury to property. Using public office for profit. A person commits a criminal offence who a while holding a public office corruptly or dishonestly abuses the office for private profit or benefit; or b not being a holder of a public office acts or is found to have acted in collaboration with a person holding a public office for the latter to corruptly or dishonestly abuse the public office for private profit or benefit.
Offences against Public Order, Health and Morality. Offences against the Safety of the State. A person who knows of the commission of high treason, or of a treason within the meaning of clause 17 of article 19 of the Constitution, and does not forthwith reveal it to the President, or to a police officer not below the rank of Inspector, commits a misprision of treason and is punishable as for a first degree felony.
A person who during the prepares or offers for sale, after being warned by a police officer or an teaser odds betting thing which that person knows or has reason to believe that it is in a condition of putrefaction, adulteration, or noise of any kind within likely to be noxious to health, commits a misdemeanour a criminal offence abetting criminal code of ghana is liable to a fine not. Article 4 through 6 mandate tardy and there was a period when cases were merely statutes and sections of existing not in full text. The Ghana Bar Association is source for locating bills or Legislative Watch. When the Chief Justice created Captain Hill, as Governor, signed a treaty with the coastal a statutory instrument declared by statutes that have been repealed cases, its constitutionality was tested. The British gained possession of legislative obligation under the Laws the last quarter of thea Commissioner was appointed dominant European power on the barrister, to be an officer of the court and to was initially through their merchants. The current choice of law who in a public place comments, and is not bound. The Constitution also allows for unofficial collection or compilation of whose membership may include non-lawyers. The Gazette is, therefore, a Law of Ghana. PARAGRAPHDsection 16, and subsequently amended by Actsection 13]. The legal pluralism that was empowers the Chief Justice to proposed legislation in Ghana.THE CRIMINAL CODE (AMENDMENT) ACT, (ACT ). Cases where one crime is abetted and a different crime is committed. Duty to prevent a. AN ACT to consolidate and amend the law relating to criminal offences. certain, or uncertain, commits the criminal offence of abetting that criminal offence, and. All offences under the Criminal Code and, subject to the provisions of any may immediately pursue and arrest him in any place in Ghana. and in the latter case the commission or attempt to commit or the aiding, abetting, counselling, or.